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ABSTRACT  
Recent surveys and studies have shown that cyber-attacks have caused a 
lot of damage to organisations, governments, and individuals around the world. 
Although developments are constantly occurring in the computer security field, 
cyber-attacks still cause damage as they are developed and evolved by 
hackers. This research looked at some industrial challenges in the intrusion 
detection area. The research identified two main challenges; the first one is that 
signature-based intrusion detection systems such as SNORT lack the capability of 
detecting attacks with new signatures without human intervention. The other 
challenge is related to multi-stage attack detection, it has been found that 
signature-based is not efficient in this area. The novelty in this research is 
presented through developing methodologies tackling the mentioned challenges. 
The first challenge was handled by developing a multi-layer classification 
methodology. The first layer is based on decision tree, while the second layer is a 
hybrid module that uses two data mining techniques; neural network, and fuzzy 
logic. The second layer will try to detect new attacks in case the first one fails to 
detect. This system detects attacks with new signatures, and then updates the 
SNORT signature holder automatically, without any human intervention. The 
obtained results have shown that a high detection rate has been obtained with 
attacks having new signatures. However, it has been found that the false positive 
rate needs to be lowered. The second challenge was approached by evaluating IP 
information using fuzzy logic. This approach looks at the identity of participants 
in the traffic, rather than the sequence and contents of the traffic. The results have 
shown that this approach can help in predicting attacks at very early stages in 
some scenarios. However, it has been found that combining this approach with a 
different approach that looks at the sequence and contents of the traffic, such as 
event- correlation, will achieve a better performance than each approach 
individually.  
KEYWORDS 
Intrusion detection; Multi-Stage attacks; IP Check; Data mining; Fuzzy Logic; 
Neural Network; Naïve base; Decision tree; SNORT 
 
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 First I would like to thank God who has been a source of blessing and 
making this project come through.  
 
I would like this opportunity to thank my supervisors, Prof. David Parish 
and Dr. James Flint who have been very patient with me and have been 
relentlessly guiding me with their expert guidance.  
 
I would also like to thank all of my colleagues in High Speed Network 
group for their support, help and for sharing their knowledge, Dr. Francisco 
Aparicio-Navarro, Dr. Konstantinos Kyriakopoulos and Gines Escudero-Andreu. 
 
I would also like to thank family especially my wife Dr. Shaimaa 
Almutairi and friends who have helped with number of tasks in the PHd. I would 
also like to extend my gratitude to my sister – Huda, for whom I wish that she will 
wake up from coma and read this thesis. And I would like to thank my parents for 
their consistent support, without them I would not be where I am today. 
 
Finally I would also thank my country Kuwait. And I would like to thank 
Prime Minister of the State of Kuwait Sheikh Jaber Mubarak Al-Hamad Al-
Sabah, And Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah Al-Mubarak Al-Sabah, and Sheikh 
Khaled Mohammad al-Khaled Al-Sabah.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1 ........................................................................................................ 1 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1 
1.1 BACKGROUND........................................................................................ 1 
1.2 MOTIVATIONS OF THE RESEARCH ........................................................... 5 
1.3 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES ........................................................... 6 
1.4 THESIS ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION ........................................................... 7 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................... 7 
1.6 THESIS OUTLINE .................................................................................... 8 
CHAPTER 2 ...................................................................................................... 10 
LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................ 10 
2.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ..................................................... 10 
2.2 CLASSIFICATION OF HONEYPOTS ......................................................... 12 
2.2.1 Low-Interaction Honeypots ................................................... 12 
2.2.2 High-Interaction Honeypots .................................................. 14 
2.3 PURPOSE OF HONEYPOT ....................................................................... 15 
2.3.1 Research Honeypot ................................................................ 15 
2.3.2 Production Honeypots ........................................................... 15 
2.4 MONITORING METHODS OF HONEYPOTS ............................................. 17 
2.5 MONITORING METHODS OF LOW-INTERACTION HONEYPOTS .............. 17 
2.5.1 Mwcollect (Malware Collection Tool) ................................... 17 
2.5.2 Honeyd ................................................................................... 18 
2.6 MONITORING METHODS OF HIGH-INTERACTION HONEYPOTS ............. 18 
2.6.1 Sebek ...................................................................................... 18 
2.6.2 Honeynets ............................................................................... 20 
2.6.3 Argos ...................................................................................... 22 
2.7 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF HONEYPOTS ......................... 23 
2.8 INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS ........................................................ 24 
2.8.1 Overview ................................................................................ 24 
2.8.2 Detection methodologies ........................................................ 26 
2.8.3 Limitations of Intrusion Detection Systems ........................... 27 
2.8.4 IDS Tools ............................................................................... 28 
2.8.5 Evaluation Metrics of IDSs .................................................... 29 
2.8.6 Offline Evaluation .................................................................. 30 
 2.8.7 Online Evaluation .................................................................. 34 
2.9 DATA MINING ...................................................................................... 36 
2.9.1 Overview ................................................................................ 36 
2.9.2 Data mining limitations ......................................................... 37 
2.9.3 Genetic algorithms ................................................................. 37 
2.9.4 Artificial Neural Network ...................................................... 38 
2.9.5 Naive Bayes ............................................................................ 39 
2.9.6 Decision Tree ......................................................................... 40 
2.9.7 K Means ................................................................................. 42 
2.9.8 Related Research Works to the first contribution .................. 44 
2.9.9 Related Research Works to the Second Contribution ............ 45 
2.9.10 Weka data mining tool ......................................................... 47 
2.10 FEATURE SELECTION ............................................................................ 47 
2.11 DISCUSSION ......................................................................................... 49 
2.12 SUMMARY ............................................................................................ 51 
CHAPTER 3 ...................................................................................................... 53 
MULTI-LAYER CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM ........................................... 53 
3.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 53 
3.2 CLASSIFICATION APPROACH ................................................................ 55 
3.3 DATA SET – KDD’99 ........................................................................... 57 
3.3.1 Overview ................................................................................ 57 
1.3.2 Features of the Data Set ........................................................ 58 
3.4 CLASSIFIER MODULE ........................................................................... 59 
3.4.1 Overview ................................................................................ 59 
3.4.2 Naïve Bayes ............................................................................ 59 
3.4.3 Decision Tree ......................................................................... 60 
3.4.4 Experiment Environment ....................................................... 61 
3.4.5 All-Classes Based Model Creation Strategy .......................... 62 
3.4.6 Two-Classes Based Model Creation Strategy ....................... 65 
3.4.7 Chosen Model ........................................................................ 67 
3.5 REASONING MODULE........................................................................... 67 
3.5.1 Overview ................................................................................ 67 
3.5.2 Neural Network ...................................................................... 69 
3.5.3 Fuzzy Logic ............................................................................ 70 
3.5.4 Experiment Environment ....................................................... 70 
 3.5.5 Experiment Results ................................................................ 74 
3.6 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 74 
CHAPTER 4 ...................................................................................................... 76 
MULTI STAGE ATTACKS ............................................................................ 76 
4.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 76 
4.2 ANALYSIS APPROACH .......................................................................... 78 
4.3 SCENARIO A ........................................................................................ 78 
4.3.1 Trace file ................................................................................ 78 
4.3.2 IP Involved in the Scenario .................................................... 79 
4.3.3 Stages of the attack ................................................................ 82 
4.3.4 Summary of the Scenario ....................................................... 85 
4.3.5 Analysis Outcome: ................................................................. 86 
4.4 SCENARIO B ......................................................................................... 87 
4.4.1 Social Engineering ................................................................. 87 
4.4.2 Operation Shady Rat Attack .................................................. 87 
4.4.3 Analysis Outcome .................................................................. 90 
4.5 SCENARIO C ......................................................................................... 91 
4.5.1 CRLF Injection ...................................................................... 91 
4.5.2 Scenario C.1 ........................................................................... 91 
4.5.3 Scenario C.2 ........................................................................... 93 
4.5.4 Analysis Outcome .................................................................. 94 
4.6 SCENARIO D ........................................................................................ 94 
4.6.1 Vulnerable FTP Service ......................................................... 94 
4.6.2 Scenario Description ............................................................. 94 
4.6.3 Analysis Outcome .................................................................. 97 
4.7 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 97 
CHAPTER 5 ...................................................................................................... 99 
MULTI STAGE ATTACKS PREDICTION ................................................. 99 
5.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 99 
5.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION ...................................... 100 
5.3 NETWORK SNIFFING MODULE ........................................................... 101 
5.3.1 Choosing a sniffing tool ....................................................... 101 
5.4 IP INFORMATION FINDER MODULE .................................................... 105 
5.4.1 IP geographic Location ....................................................... 105 
5.4.2 IP Block List ......................................................................... 107 
 5.4.3 IP Rating .............................................................................. 109 
5.4.4 Implementation .................................................................... 109 
5.5 THE REASONING MODULE .................................................................. 111 
5.5.1 Data Mining Technique Selection ........................................ 111 
5.5.2 Pre-processing the inputs .................................................... 112 
5.5.3 Fuzzy logic ........................................................................... 113 
5.5.4 Implementation .................................................................... 116 
5.5.5 Using Message Broker ......................................................... 118 
5.6 SUMMARY .......................................................................................... 121 
CHAPTER 6 .................................................................................................... 123 
EVALUATION ............................................................................................... 123 
6.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 123 
6.2 LOGISTICS EVALUATION .................................................................... 124 
6.2.1 Distributed Management ..................................................... 124 
6.2.2 Ease of Configuration ............................................................. 125 
6.2.3 Ease of Policy Management ................................................ 126 
6.2.4 Outsource Solutions ............................................................. 126 
6.2.5 Platform Requirements ........................................................ 127 
6.2.6 Conclusion ........................................................................... 127 
6.3 DESIGN METRICS ............................................................................... 128 
6.3.1 Adjustable sensitivity ........................................................... 128 
6.3.2 Data storage ........................................................................ 129 
6.3.3 Multi sensor support ............................................................ 129 
6.3.4 Firewall Interaction ............................................................. 129 
6.3.5 Incident logging and notifications ....................................... 129 
6.3.6 Packet Loss .......................................................................... 130 
6.3.7 System throughput ................................................................ 130 
6.3.8 Conclusion ........................................................................... 130 
6.4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION ............................................................. 131 
6.4.1 Testing Data ......................................................................... 131 
6.4.2 First Phase ........................................................................... 132 
6.4.3 The Second Phase ................................................................ 134 
6.5 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 136 
CHAPTER 7 .................................................................................................... 138 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK .................................................... 138 
 7.1 OVERVIEW ......................................................................................... 138 
7.2 AUTOMATIC CREATION FOR SNORT RULES ..................................... 139 
7.3 MULTI-STAGE ATTACK PREDICTION ................................................. 141 
7.4 FUTURE WORK .................................................................................. 145 
7.5 PUBLICATIONS RELATED TO THIS THESIS .......................................... 146 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................ 147 
APPENDIX A: PROJECT PLAN ................................................................. 164 
A.1 PROJECT MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY ............................................... 164 
A.2 PROJECT SCHEDULE ................................................................................ 164 
A.3 RESOURCE PLAN ...................................................................................... 167 
A.3 COMMUNICATIONS PLAN ......................................................................... 168 
A.4 RISK PLAN ............................................................................................... 168 
APPENDIX B:  NEURAL NETWORK TRAINING CODE ...................... 171 
APPENDIX C:  FUZZY RULES GENERATION CODE .......................... 172 
APPENDIX D:  HYBRID MODULE CODE ............................................... 174 
APPENDIX E:  NETWORK SNIFFING MODULE CODE ...................... 179 
APPENDIX F:  IP INFORMATION FINDER MODULE ......................... 180 
APPENDIX G:  THE REASONING MODULE CODE ............................. 181 
APPENDIX H:  THE NETWORK SNIFFING MODULE CODE 
WITH A MESSAGE BROKER .................................................................... 183 
APPENDIX I:  THE IP INFORMATION MODULE CODE WITH A 
MESSAGE BROKER ..................................................................................... 185 
APPENDIX J:  THE TEST SCRIPT FOR MULTI-STAGE 
PREDICTION ................................................................................................. 187 
  
 LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 2.1: CLASSIFICATION OF HONEYPOTS .......................................................... 16 
TABLE 2.2: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF IDS METHODOLOGIES (LIAO ET 
AL. 2012) ........................................................................................................ 27 
TABLE 2.3: ATTACK TYPES IN EVALUATION DATA SET (SOURCE: (LIPPMANN ET AL. 
2000)) ............................................................................................................. 33 
TABLE 2.4: TAXONOMY OF MACE EXPLOITS (SOURCE: (SOMMERS ET AL., 2005)) 35 
TABLE 2.5: TRIDENT TOOLS DEVELOPED FOR NIDS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
(SOURCE: (SOMMERS ET AL. 2006)) ................................................................ 35 
TABLE 2.6: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DATA MINING TECHNIQUES .... 44 
TABLE 3.1: RESULTS FOR NAÏVE BAYES AND DECISION TREE USING AN ALL-
CLASSES MODEL CREATION STRATEGY ......................................................... 62 
TABLE 3.2: ACCURACY / CLASS FOR NAÏVE BAYES AND DECISION TREE USING 
ALL-CLASSES MODEL CREATION STRATEGY ................................................. 64 
TABLE 3.3: RESULTS FOR NAÏVE BAYES AND DECISION TREE USING TWO-CLASSES 
MODEL CREATION STRATEGY ........................................................................ 65 
TABLE 3.4: ACCURACY / CLASS FOR NAÏVE BAYES AND DECISION TREE TWO-
CLASSES MODEL CREATION STRATEGY .......................................................... 66 
TABLE 3.5: RESULTS OF THE HYBRID MODEL USING NEURAL NETWORK AND FUZZY 
LOGIC ............................................................................................................. 74 
TABLE 4.1: IP ADDRESSES PARTICIPATED IN THE FIRST SCENARIO AS SOURC .......... 80 
TABLE 4.2: IP ADDRESSES PARTICIPATED IN THE FIRST SCENARIO AS DESTINATIONS
 ....................................................................................................................... 81 
TABLE 4.3:  DNS QUERY ........................................................................................ 82 
TABLE 4.4: DNS RESPONSE .................................................................................... 82 
TABLE 4.5: FAILURE TO ESTABLISH A CONNECTION ............................................... 83 
TABLE 4.6: FAILURE TO ESTABLISH A CONNECTION ............................................... 83 
TABLE 4.7: COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE COMPROMISED AND TARGETED HOST 84 
 TABLE 4.8: BOT NET COMMANDS USED BETWEEN THE COMPROMISED AND 
TARGETED HOSTS ............................................................................................ 85 
TABLE 5.1:  A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OVER DIFFERENT SNIFFING TOOLS ......... 103 
TABLE 5.2: API REQUEST FOR FINDING IP GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION (NEUTRINO API, 
2013) ............................................................................................................ 106 
TABLE 5.3:  API RESPONSE FOR FINDING IP GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION   (NEUTRINO 
API, 2013) .................................................................................................... 107 
TABLE 5.4: API REQUEST FOR FINDING IP GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION (NEUTRINO API, 
2013) ............................................................................................................ 108 
TABLE 5.5: API RESPONSE FOR FINDING IP GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION   (NEUTRINO 
API, 2013) .................................................................................................... 108 
TABLE 5.6: API REQUEST FOR FINDING IP RATING (NEUTRINO API, 2013) ......... 109 
TABLE 5.7: API RESPONSE FOR FINDING IP RATING (NEUTRINO API, 2013) ........ 109 
TABLE 5.8: THE REASONING MODULE INPUTS ....................................................... 112 
TABLE 5.9: PRE-PROCESSING THE REASONING MODULE INPUTS ............................ 112 
TABLE 5.10: IF THEN RULES USED IN THE REASONING MODULE ............................ 115 
TABLE 6.1: LOGISTIC METRICS ............................................................................. 128 
TABLE 6.2: TEST ENVIRONMENT FOR MEASURING SYSTEM THROUGHPUT` ........... 130 
TABLE 6.3: DESIGN METRICS ................................................................................ 131 
TABLE 6.4: DIFFERENT CLASSES IN THE IP TEST LIST ............................................ 132 
TABLE 6.5: THE CONFUSION METRICS ................................................................... 134 
TABLE 6.6: THE CONFUSION METRICS AFTER USING THE FRAUD LAB WEB SERVICE TO 
DETECT ANONYMOUS PROXY ........................................................................ 134 
TABLE 6.7:  IP PARTICIPATED IN THE SQL ATTACK SCENARIO ............................... 135 
TABLE 6.8: IP PARTICIPATED IN THE UDP SCAN SCENARIO .................................. 135 
TABLE 6.9: IP PARTICIPATED IN THE CROSS SITE FORGERY SCENARIO ................... 136 
TABLE 6.10: IP PARTICIPATED IN DICTIONARY ATTACK AGAINST FTP SERVER ..... 136 
  
 LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE 1.1: DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS FOR EXTERNAL CONSEQUENCES OF TARGETED 
CYBER-ATTACKS REPORTED BY STATISTIA (2015) ............................................ 2 
FIGURE 1.2: DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS FOR EXTERNAL CONSEQUENCES OF TARGETED 
CYBER-ATTACKS REPORTED BY PONEMON INSTITUTE (2014) ........................... 3 
FIGURE 2.1: CONTROL PANEL FOR SPECTER TOOL SHOWING SERVICES THAT MAY BE 
EMULATED (SOURCE: (NETSEC, 2012)) ........................................................... 13 
FIGURE 2.2: HTTP SERVICE EMULATION SETUP USING KFSENSOR (SOURCE: 
(KFSENSOR, 2012)) ........................................................................................ 14 
FIGURE 2.3: INSTANCE OF MODIFIED SYS_READ SYSTEM CALL AFTER LOADING OF 
SEBEK ............................................................................................................. 19 
FIGURE 2.4: SEBEK BASED APPROACH IN HONEYPOT MONITORING IN CONTEXT OF 
HTTP (SOURCE: (JIANG AND WANG, 2007)) .................................................. 20 
FIGURE 2.5: HONEYWALL ARCHITECTURE (SOURCE: (PROJECT, 2012)).................. 21 
FIGURE 2.6: HIGH-LEVEL OVERVIEW OF ARGOS (SOURCE: (PORTOKALIDIS ET AL., 
2006)) ............................................................................................................. 23 
FIGURE 2.7: CONCEPTUAL VIEW OF DARPA EVALUATION TEST BED THAT CREATE 
1000’S OF VIRTUAL HOSTS AND 100’S OF USERS TO SIMULATE A SMALL AIR 
FORCE BASE SEPARATED BY ROUTER FROM THE INTERNET (SOURCE: 
(LIPPMANN ET AL., 2000)) .............................................................................. 31 
FIGURE 3.1: HIGH LEVEL VIEW OF RESEARCH PROCESS ......................................... 55 
FIGURE 3.2: ATTRIBUTES SELECTED UPON USING CFS EVALUATOR AND DEPTH FIRST 
SEARCH ........................................................................................................... 59 
FIGURE 3.3: VARIANCE OF PREDICTED VS. EXPECTED CLASSES USING THE NAÏVE 
BAYES ALL-CLASSES MODEL CREATION STRATEGY ........................................ 63 
FIGURE 3.4: VARIANCE OF PREDICTED VS. EXPECTED CLASSES USING DECISION 
TREE ALL- CLASSES MODEL CREATION STRATEGY .......................................... 63 
FIGURE 3.5: VARIANCE OF PREDICTED VS. EXPECTED CLASSES USING NAÏVE BAYES 
TWO-CLASSES MODEL CREATION STRATEGY ................................................... 65 
 FIGURE 3.6: VARIANCE OF PREDICTED VS. EXPECTED CLASSES USING DECISION 
TREE TWO-CLASSES MODEL CREATION STRATEGY .......................................... 66 
FIGURE 3.7: HYBRID MODEL OVERVIEW ................................................................ 68 
FIGURE 3.8: FUZZY LOGIC COMPONENTS ................................................................ 70 
FIGURE 3.9: MEMBERSHIP FUNCTION FOR THE SELECTED FEATURE (NOT INCLUDING 
THE ‘SERVICE’ FEATURE) ................................................................................ 73 
FIGURE 3.10: MEMBERSHIP FUNCTION FOR THE OUTPUT......................................... 73 
FIGURE 4.1:  STAGES OF SCENARIO A ..................................................................... 86 
FIGURE 4.2:  EXAMPLE OF HTML COMMENTS USED EMBEDDED IN HTML TO BE 
USED BY MALWARE ........................................................................................ 89 
FIGURE 4.3: STAGES OF SCENARIO B....................................................................... 90 
FIGURE 4.4: CRLF INJECTION ON A PHP SCRIPT .................................................... 92 
FIGURE 4.5: STAGES OF SCENARIO C.1.................................................................... 93 
FIGURE 4.6: USING NMAP TOOL TO FIND AN OPEN PORT (PENTRATION TESTING LAB, 
2012) .............................................................................................................. 95 
FIGURE 4.7: USING THE METASPLOIT TOOL TO FIND A VALID FTP LOGIN 
(PENTRATION TESTING LAB, 2012) ................................................................ 96 
FIGURE 4.8: STAGES OF SCENARIO D ...................................................................... 97 
FIGURE 5.1: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION TO DETECT MULTI-STAGE 
ATTACKS ....................................................................................................... 101 
FIGURE 5.2: THE OUTPUT OF THE TCPDUMP COMMAND ..................................... 104 
FIGURE 5.3: THE FLOW CHART OF THE NETWORK SNIFFING MODULE .................... 104 
FIGURE 5.4: BLACK-LISTED COUNTRIES SELECTION ............................................ 106 
FIGURE 5.5: THE FLOW CHART OF THE IP INFO FINDER MODULE ........................... 110 
FIGURE 5.6: A FUZZY LOGIC ELEMENTS ................................................................ 113 
FIGURE 5.7: THE MEMBERSHIP FUNCTION SELECTED FOR THE INPUTS HAVING 
BOOLEAN VALUES ........................................................................................ 114 
FIGURE 5.8: THE SELECTED MEMBERSHIP FUNCTION FOR IP REPUTATION ............ 114 
FIGURE 5.9: THE SELECTED MEMBERSHIP FUNCTION FOR THE OUTPUT ................. 116 
 FIGURE 5.10: THE FLOW CHART OF THE REASONING MODULE ............................... 117 
FIGURE 5.11: THE MODIFIED VERSION OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION AFTER ADDING A 
MESSAGE BROKER ......................................................................................... 118 
FIGURE 5.12: NETWORK SNIFFING MODULE WHEN USING MESSAGE BROKER ........ 119 
FIGURE 5.13: THE FLOW CHART OF THE IP INFORMATION MODULE WHEN USING 
MESSAGE BROKERS ....................................................................................... 120 
FIGURE 6.1: DISTRIBUTED MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE ................................... 125 
 
 
  
 GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 AD: Anomaly-based Detection. 
 Anonymous Proxy: It is a server that acts as a middleman between a 
machine and the internet. It is used to hide a user’s identity when 
communicating with the internet. 
 Bot: is a program that is designed to carry out a number of tasks and 
normally waits for orders to be executed from a master computer.  
 Botnet: a group of machines that are infected by a bot controlled by the 
same master. 
 CFS: correlation-based feature selection.  
 Confusion matrix: representation of actual and predicted results for a 
classification. In this context, it is used to measure the performance of a 
classification system.  
 CPU: Computer Processing Unit. 
 CRLF: Carriage Return Line Feed. 
 Cross Site scripting: it is a vulnerability that allows attackers to inject 
client side code  to a web page accessed by other users. 
 DDOS attacks: is a distributed denial of service. It is a denial of service 
that is carried out in a planned manner by multiple attackers targeting one 
victim.  
 Denial of Service: a denial of service is defined as an attempt by attackers 
to affect a machine in a way that it will not deliver a service for users 
having permissions of access. Affected machines become irresponsive in 
this case. 
 DNS: Domain Name System. 
 DNSBL: Domain Name System Block Lists. 
 False negative: In this context, false negative refers to alert not raised by a 
system while it is supposed to be raised. In this case, the system thinks it is 
a normal traffic while it is an attack. 
 False positive: In this context, false positive refers to alert raised by a 
system while it is not supposed to be raised. In this case, the system thinks 
it is an attack while it is normal traffic.  
 FCBF: Fast Correlation Based Filter. 
  Firewall: It is a software or hardware system designed to check incoming 
traffic from outside the network (e.g. the Internet), and then decides either 
to pass the traffic or stop it based on the firewall settings (e.g. block 
unauthorized access). 
 Flood attacks: can be defined as any kind of attack that is carried out to 
target a system by overwhelming the system resources. It can be achieved 
by flooding the system with a large number of requests or responses. 
 FTTP: File Transfer Protocol. 
 GR: gain ratio.  
 Honeypot: Bandy (2015) defined it as a tool used to protect networks 
from unauthorized access, it does not contain data or applications that are 
critical to an organization but it has some data that hacker have an interest 
in. In other word, it is a computer in a network configured to interact with 
hackers in order to get some details about their attacks. 
 HTTP: Hyper Text Transfer Protocol. 
 ICMP: Internet Control Messaging Protocol. 
 IG: information gain.  
 Intrusion Detection Systems: An Intrusion Detection System is a 
software or hardware system that monitors incoming and outgoing 
network traffic and raises an alert when detecting malicious activities in 
the traffic. More details about intrusion detection systems are included in 
chapter two.  
 Intrusion Prevention System: it is an Intrusion Detection System but 
able to take an action when detecting malicious traffic.  
 ISP: Internet Service Provider. 
 KDD: Knowledge Discovery and Data. 
 LAMP: it is a development framework that includes Linux as an operating 
system, APACHE as a web server, MYSQL as a database, and PHP as a 
programming language. 
 LARIAT: Lincoln Adaptable Real-time Information Assurance Testbed.  
 MACE: Malicious Traffic Composition Environment. 
 MLP: Multi-Level Perceptron. 
 Multi stage attack: It is an attack that occurs through multiple steps 
without violating any rules. More details about this type of attacks are 
discussed in chapter four. 
  NMAP: Network Mapper. 
 NNTP:  Network News Transfer Protocol. 
 PCAP: Packet Capture. 
 RAM: Random Access Memory. 
 SD: Signature-based Detection. 
 SNORT: is a signature based intrusion detection system. 
 SPA: Stateful Protocol Analysis. 
 SPAMS: this expression is used when referring to sending a large amount 
of unrequested emails.  
 Threats: the possibility of exploiting a vulnerability to carry out an attack 
targeting the system having the vulnerabilities.  
 Trace file: a file that contains activities belonging to a user or software. In 
this context, trace file contains network activities (outgoing and incoming 
packets). 
 True negative: In this context, true negative refers to the correct 
behaviour of a system when there is no attack. The system does not raise 
any alert in this case. 
 True positive:  In this context, true positive refers to the correct behaviour 
of a system when there is an attack. The system raises any alert in this 
case. 
 URL: Uniform Resource Locator 
 Virus: a program that is developed with a malicious purpose to affect a 
system in a harmful way. 
 Vulnerabilities: A vulnerability can be defined as a weakness in a system 
design, implementation, or configuration that can be exploited by an 
attacker resulting in security breach, overcoming the system’s security 
policy, or leading to compromising a machine.  
 Worms: a worm is malicious software that can spread itself across 
networks without the need of any human intervention through emails and 
file sharing etc. 
 XSF: Cross Site Forgery. 
 XSS: Cross Site Scripting. 
 Zombie army:  is a machine connected to the Internet configured to 
forward malicious traffic (including spam or viruses) to other machines on 
the Internet, without any permission from the machine owner.  
  Zombies: A machine infected with a malicious program and set to be a 
part of a botnet. 
 NIDS: Network Based Intrusion Detection System. 
 HIDS: Host Based Intrusion Detection Systems. 
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CHAPTER 1            
_________________ 
 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
There is no doubt that the Internet plays an important role in different aspects 
of life these days. For example, it has been found that social networking such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and Linked-in have a remarkable impact in bringing people from 
different parts of the world together (Muila, 2010). Although it has changed the 
world, it has raised the possibility that malicious users gain illegal access to 
organizations to steal confidential information they are interested in or destroy it by 
injecting applications called malware. Those applications are created to give 
malicious users the ability to control organizations’ computers remotely.  Malicious 
users get an illegal access to those organizations by exploiting weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities in organizations’ networks or web applications. The impact of attacks 
can lead to delaying delivering services in some organizations causing financial 
damages.  A survey made by Statistia (2015) provides information on the distribution 
of costs for external consequences of targeted cyber-attacks on companies in global 
markets in 2014. Figure 1.1 shows the results obtained in that survey, it was found 
that 38 percent of participants pointed to business disruption as the most expensive 
consequence of a cyber-attack on their business. 
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of costs for external consequences of targeted 
cyber-attacks reported by Statistia (2015) 
Williams (2014) reported that cyber-attacks were estimated to cost the global 
economy around $445 billion annually. She also reported that those attacks affected 
more than 800 million people in 2013. An annual study conducted by the Ponemon 
institute (2014) in seven countries including the United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany, Australia, Japan, France and the Russian Federation. The study involves a 
total benchmark sample of 257 organizations. Figure 1.2 presents the estimated 
average cost of cyber attacks for each country, it has been found that the US sample 
achieved the highest total average cost at $12.7 million while the Russian Federation 
sample got the lowest total average cost at $3.3 million. The figure also that the cost 
of cyber attacks went up in six countries during the past year compared to 2013 (apart 
of the Russian Federation), the highest increase was found in the United Kingdom 
(22.7%) while the lowest increase was found in Japan (2.7%). The study also reported 
that all industries are targeted by cyber-attacks, but with different levels. The study 
pointed out that organisation providing energy and financial services experience 
higher cyber-attack costs than organizations providing services in media, life sciences 
and healthcare. 
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of costs for external consequences of targeted 
cyber-attacks reported by Ponemon institute (2014) 
 An example of those attacks is a cyber-attack targeted the Dutch 
government’s main website for most of 10th February 2015, it was reported by 
Reuters (2015) about that incident the following:  
“Cyber attackers crippled the Dutch government's main websites for most of 
Tuesday and back-up plans proved ineffective, exposing the vulnerability of critical 
infrastructure at a time of heightened concern about online security. The outage 
affected most of the central government's major websites, which provide 
information to the public and the media” 
Another example of those attacks was against the online payment site PayPal 
in 2010. Rawlings (2013) reported that after WikiLeaks had issued a lot of classified 
material, PayPal decided to block WikiLeaks’ accounts in a way that stop anti-secrecy 
site from receiving online donations. That action pushed the anonymous group to 
launch an attack against PayPal, the aim of their efforts was to make the access to the 
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website impossible affecting all integrations between many of websites and paypal. 
The cost of this attack was estimated to be £3.5 million. 
The impact of such attacks has made the internet security not only a matter 
related to businesses and organizations but extended to include national pushing 
governments to play an important role in that area (Statistia, 2015).  
Detecting malicious activities occurring in a computers or networks can be 
achieved using IDS which is considered a security management system that monitor 
network traffic and raise an alert when capturing malicious activities. IDS have been 
widely employed in many organizations to detect attacks. The increase of their usage 
is down to availability of IDS as free of charge, and open source. In addition, there is 
a wide community of exports (Muila, 2010).  Although the wide spread and usage of 
IDS over the world, there are many challenges that make detecting some attacks 
difficult. One of the main challenges is the ability to provide protection against new 
attacks. Cyber attacks can get more costly for an organization if not detected quickly 
(Ponemon, 2014).That challenge was described by SANS (2001) as following: 
“The IDS technology is still reactive rather than proactive. The IDS 
technology works on attack signatures. Attack signatures are attack patterns of 
previous attacks. The signature database needs to be updated whenever a different 
kind of attack is detected and the fix for the same is available. The frequency of 
signature update varies from vendor to vendor.” 
Another challenge is minimizing human intervention. Werlinger (2008) 
reported that IDS require a lot of human resources in the monitoring and analysis 
phases   to investigate captured attacks and tune the system in order to reduce number 
of false alarms. Therefore, managing to minimize human intervention will lead to 
minimizing the operational cost of using IDS inside an organization. 
  One of IDS tools that is commonly used and has many researchers conducted 
to improve it is SNORT It is an example of signature based IDS. Many researches 
were conducted to evaluate the performance of this tool. There are also many efforts 
made by researchers to improve SNORT detection capabilities using data mining 
techniques such as genetic algorithm, and decision tree. In this research, a multi-layer 
system based on data mining techniques is proposed to update automatically the 
SNORT’s (an open source network intrusion prevention system) signature holder 
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without the need of any human intervention. In addition, part of the solution proposed 
in this research also work in conjunction with SNORT to detect multi stage attacks 
that SNORT has limited capabilities to detect them. 
1.2 Motivations of the research 
The industrial challenges for improving intrusion detection systems are the 
motivation of this research project.  As mentioned in the background section, 
minimizing the human intervention is one of those challenges. Although intrusion 
detection systems manage to reduce the time spent in capturing suspicious activities, 
other actions have been found dependant on human interventions.  One of those 
actions is controlling the sensitivity to reduce the false positive rate. In addition, 
human intervention is required to update some intrusion detection systems with new 
rules to detect new attacks. Such actions are very time consuming, automating some 
of those actions will speed up the process of identifying intrusions and consequently 
will lead to a drop in the cost of attack response cycle (Hawrylkiw, 2002).  
Detecting or predicting multi stage attacks is another challenge that is worth 
considering. Multistage attacks can evolve dramatically these days, causing much loss 
and damage to organisations. These attacks occur through multiple steps, each step 
looking legal and not violating any rules for some intrusion detection systems. 
Different solutions have been introduced to detect multi-stage attacks, some of those 
being event correlation-based. Event-correlation based solutions try to match network 
events with certain attack patterns. When a stream of network events matches a 
certain pattern, attacks can be stopped before progressing to the next stages. Many 
researchers claim the effectiveness of that approach in detecting multi-stage attacks 
However, this approach requires having up-to-date multi-stage attack patterns 
(sequences), which is not easy to achieve in a very short time, as discovering new 
complex attacks normally takes some time. The Shady Rat Operation attack is a good 
example of that; it started in 2006 and was only discovered in 2011 (Tal Global, 
2011). 
This thesis describes a solution that contributes in overcoming the mentioned 
challenges. The proposed solution has handled the first challenge by creating an 
intelligent system integrated with SNORT, this system uses data mining techniques to 
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detect new attacks not captured by SNORT then updates SNORT with the signature 
of those attacks automatically. The other challenge has been handled in this research 
by creating a system that follows IP information evaluation approach. This approach 
looks at the identity of the network traffic source rather than the sequence. In other 
words, it asks this question “who is communicating with us?”  Rather than “what is 
being done in our environment?”  The attackers usually try to hide their identities by 
using anonymous proxies. In addition, their traffic in many scenarios involves 
communications with IPs having bad reputation. Therefore, evaluating IP information 
(e.g. is the IP an anonymous proxy) can help in predicting potential attacks before 
their occurrence.   
1.3 Research Aim and objectives 
This research work aims to improve intrusion detection by proposing a new 
approach that will work in conjunction with SNORT; this approach will handle some 
of SNORT shortcomings. One of those shortcomings is the ability to detect recent 
attacks, the solution will be built in to detect those attacks then update SNORT with 
signatures of those attacks.  Another shortcoming the proposed system will handle is 
its deficiency in detecting some multi stage attack scenarios; the other solution will 
not interact with SNORT. The proposed solution uses several data mining techniques 
in handling those shortcomings. In order to achieve the aim (using the approach), the 
following objectives would be met:  
- Conducting a literature survey about intrusion detection systems by looking 
at different IDS tools and researches carried out using data mining 
techniques to improve them. 
- Finding suitable data set for training and evaluation as the solution will use 
some machine learning algorithms. 
- Building a classifier (first layer) based on machine learning algorithm that 
will be considered as the first defence line against new attacks. 
- Building a reasoning module that will act as a second layer of classification 
module for traffic that the first layer will fail to classify. 
- Analysing four different multi stage attack scenarios to understand multi 
stage attack behaviour.    
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- Building a solution that predicts multi stage attacks based on the analysis 
carried out on multi stage attack scenarios. 
- Measuring the effectiveness of the system that detects multi stage attacks 
using metrics based approach. 
1.4 Thesis original contribution  
The contributions made in the thesis are as follows: 
1. A methodology has been proposed that aims to improve the SNORT 
performance by automating adding the signature of recent attacks. The 
methodology involves two layers. The first layer is decision tree based 
while the second layers is a hybrid module that uses a neural network and 
the fuzzy logic. Using three different data mining techniques over the two 
layers reduces the chance of passing new attacks without detection. 
2. A methodology has been introduced to predict/detect multi stage attacks 
based on evaluating IP information using fuzzy log. The methodology 
involves using of three modules; network sniffing, IP information finder, 
and the reasoning module.  
3. A validation approach has been used to evaluate the approach used to 
detect multi stage attacks. The validation approach is a modified version 
of a metrics-based approach introduced in a validation study. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
The research methodology followed in this research is a combination between 
qualitative and iterative experimental approach. The qualitative approach has been 
used to understand some concepts and systems behaviour while the iterative 
experimental approach is used when building the systems. In the iterative 
experimental approach, the system is initial implemented then tested. Based on the 
obtained results, the system implementation is modified until reaching to a point 
where obtained results are acceptable.  
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1.6 Thesis Outline 
 Chapter 2: The second chapter in this thesis provides a literature review. It 
provides a discussion various types of honeypots, the discussion includes 
detailing monitoring methods used by Honeypots. In addition, it enumerates 
advantages and shortcomings of Honeypots/Honeynet. The chapter also goes 
through IDS giving a quick overview then going through different intrusion 
detection methodologies, available IDS tools in the market detailing their cons 
and pros, and talking about limitations of IDS. This part of the thesis also 
walks through different data mining techniques and how they are employed in 
improving intrusion detection systems by some researchers and result obtained 
by that employment. Moreover, the chapter looks at feature selection 
algorithms showing how it can play a vital role in IDS.  
 Chapter 3: The third chapter in this research proposes a system that can be 
used to improve SNORT. The proposed system uses data mining techniques to 
detect malicious packets that SNORT is not able to capture then automatically 
updates SNORT signatures holder with a new one. The chapter provides a 
brief background overview over data mining techniques used in the proposed 
system (Decision tree, Naïve Base, Neural Network, Fuzzy logic). The chapter 
goes through the data set used for training and evaluation (KDD99) and which 
features from the data are selected in the proposed system. In addition, it 
shows how each module is trained and evaluated. This part of the thesis 
provides the evaluation results obtained from the proposed system in a form a 
confusion matrix showing how well the system is capable of performing its 
job. 
 Chapter 4: This chapter goes through four different multi-stage attack 
scenarios. The aim of this chapter is to understand the behaviour of multi-
stage attacks and try to find a clue to predicting or detecting such kinds of 
attacks. In each scenario, the network traffic will be analysed highlighting all 
steps that have occurred and not been considered by many security systems. 
The outcome from analysing each scenario will be in the form of rules that 
will be used in building a solution that will predict multi-stage attacks before 
they have an impact and damage organisations. 
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 Chapter 5: This chapter presents the proposed solution to detect multi stage 
attacks. It goes through the architecture of the solution detailing the interaction 
between different modules. In addition to this, it goes through each module 
individually showing different options for implementation and reasoning why 
one of them is preferred over others. The chapter includes some pieces of the 
codes that show the logic in each module. 
 Chapter 6: This chapter presents the evaluation for the solution proposed in 
chapter 5. The evaluation process involves following a metrics based approach 
then comparing the proposed solution with solutions proposed by other 
researchers. The metrics based approach evaluates the system from different 
perspectives; it includes logistics metrics, design metrics, and performance 
metrics.  
 Chapter 7: This chapter presents the conclusion and future work. It provides a 
critical review of the work done and pointing to areas than require some 
enhancement to achieve better results. 
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CHAPTER 2 
_________________ 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction and Background 
 Information security is becoming a primary concern in this age of 
information. The classical method of security that was more or less 
defensive is now being scaled to more aggressive defence format. Intrusion 
detection is a process of monitoring networks and machine within the 
network for unauthorised usage and or activity. Meijerink and Spellen 
(2006) define Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) as a system for detection 
of unwanted manipulation to system. This manipulation may be in form of 
attack by an attacker or simply by use of malicious script that changes the 
fingerprint of the system under attack (Kuwatly et al., 2004). Typically, an 
IDS is required for detection of all malicious traffic that cannot be detected 
by generally deployed tools such as firewall. IDSs are categorised into host-
based (HIDS) – where data on individual computer system is examined and 
network-based (NIDS) – where analysis of data packets that transit over the 
network is carried out. According to Meijerink and Spellen (2006), various 
types of network attacks include data driven attacks on applications and 
   11 
network attack on services and host attacks include unauthorised logins, 
setup of malware, access to files and changing of privileges.  
Unlike common IDSs, honeypot technology tends to provide the 
attacker with important resources that are needed for a successful attack. 
Honeypot or honeynet based decoy system is implemented for the purpose 
of intrusion detection and protection. A honeypot is difficult to define as 
there are number of interpretations that have been understood from the 
literature which include domains of attack prevention, attack detection, data 
collection in context of security. It is distinctive as it is technology and not a 
solution or procedure / process to resolve a particular security issues. A 
honeypot is a trap set to detect, deflect or in some cases counteract the 
attempts of unauthorised usage of production systems. It appears to be part 
of a network but remains isolated and protected. Its value lies in being 
probed, attacked and compromised (Spitzner, 2003). Hence, honeypots has 
no production value and they should not work with any legitimate traffic or 
events. According to (Mokube and Adams, 2007), the purpose of honeypot 
or monitored honeynet networks include the following: 
1. They form a defensive distraction system in order to direct an attacker 
towards machines containing no valuable information; 
2. They serve the purpose of a early warning system that can inform about 
exploitation trends; and 
3. They become a data collection store that can be used to examine the 
methods and processes of exploitation of a honeypot. 
The interaction with honeypots is expected from attackers; hence the 
value of honeypot lies in unauthorised interaction conducted by abusers of 
the vulnerable honeypot. 
Another term that is used regularly with honeypots is Honeynet that 
means a network that is formed of one or more honeypots (Gupta et al., 
2012). Honeypots are classified based on level of interaction and purpose. 
Further details regarding the same are discussed in Section 2. 
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This chapter has been organised as follows: In Section 2, we discuss 
various types of honeypots. Section 3 goes through purpose of Honeypot 
followed by three sections (4, 5, and 6) where details regarding monitoring 
methods used by Honeypots are discussed in detail. Section 7 enumerates 
advantages and shortcomings of Honeypots / Honeynet. Section 8 discusses 
IDS giving a quick overview then going through different intrusion 
detection methodologies and finally talking about limitations of IDS. In 
section 9, data mining is briefly explained then some of techniques used in 
data mining are critically discussed. Section 10 talk about feature selection 
algorithm and how it can play a vital role in IDS. Section 11 provides a 
discussion about the chapter. Finally, Section 12 gives a summary of this 
chapter. 
2.2 Classification of Honeypots 
2.2.1 Low-Interaction Honeypots 
A low-interaction honeypot simulates only limited services that 
cannot be exploited enough to gain total control of the honeypot (Sharma 
and Sran, 2011). The low level honeypot provides emulating services and 
operating system to the attacker, which makes it easier to deploy, and 
maintain. Example of emulated services include FTP service, listening on 
port 21 (Telnet), login to FTP server etc. The emulated services mitigate 
risk by containing the attacker’s activity. The interaction between this type 
of honeypot and production system is very limited. These type of honeypots 
can be compared to passive IDS as network traffic is not modified in any 
way and they do not interact with the attacker thus mitigating the risk 
associated with this category of honeypots (Mokube and Adams, 2007). 
Generally, low-interaction honeypots are used to analyse spammers and can 
also be used for providing countermeasures against worms. 
 A well-known example of a commercial low interaction honeypot 
is Honeyd (Provos, 2003).  Honeyd (Provos, 2003) is a daemon that can 
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used to simulate a large network on a single network host. It is a framework 
for creating virtual honeypots using unused IP addresses of a network, 
which simulates various operating systems and services. Other low-
interaction honeypot include Specter (Netsec, 2012) and KFSensor 
(KFSensor, 2012). Specter can monitor a total of 14 TCP ports and of these 
14 monitored ports, 7 ports are called traps, and the other 7 are called 
services. Traps are port listeners: when the attacker makes a connection, the 
attempt is terminated, and then logged. Services are more advanced where 
there is interaction with the attacker, emulating the application (Netsec, 
2012). The level of emulation depends on each service. For example, the 
HTTP service emulates a simple Web server with default static Web pages. 
Figure 2.1, shows the control panel for low-interaction honeypot tool – 
Specter and KFSensor simulates system services at the application layer 
(Kuwatly et al., 2004). Reference (KFSensor, 2012) explains the methods in 
which KFSensor can be used to setup new firewall rules. Figure 2.2, shows 
the HTTP service emulation within low interaction honeypot tool – 
KFSensor. 
 
Figure 2.1: Control panel for specter tool showing services that may be 
emulated (Source: (Netsec, 2012)) 
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Figure 2.2: HTTP service emulation setup using KFSensor 
(Source: (KFSensor, 2012)) 
2.2.2 High-Interaction Honeypots 
 High interaction honeypots are complex solutions, which include 
deploying of a real operating systems and applications (Saini et al., 2011). 
As it involves real operating system, the level of risk is increased by many 
folds, but it is a trade-off in order to capture extensive amounts of 
information by allowing the attackers to interact with real systems (Singh 
and Joshi, 2011). This facilitates capturing / logging of full extent of 
attacker’s behaviour that can be analysed at later stage. According to (Singh 
and Joshi, 2011), as the attacker has more resources to exploit at his 
disposal, a high interaction honeypot should be regularly monitored to 
ensure that it does not become a security issue. 
Example of high interaction honeypots include Honeynets (Project, 
2012), Sebek (Huang et al., 2009),  Argos (Portokalidis et al., 2006). Argos 
offer a full operating system to the attacker and when the attackers tries to 
   15 
do something malicious the honeypot will shut down and makes dumps of 
memory and disk to get information about what the attacker was trying to do 
(Meijerink and Spellen, 2006).  A greater detail regarding the high 
interaction monitoring methods is discussed in Section 6. 
2.3 Purpose of Honeypot 
2.3.1 Research Honeypot 
 A research honeypot is used to gain the information about the 
attacker’s community and does not add any direct value to the organisation 
(Sadasivam et al., 2005). The purpose of research honeypots is to gather 
intelligence regarding general threats that an organisation may face and 
hence allow organisation to protect itself in a better form against those 
analysed threats. The primary function is to study the method how attacker 
attacks, understand their objectives and behaviour (Saini et al., 2011). These 
type of honeypots are like high-interaction honeypots that are complex to 
deploy and difficult to maintain. They are generally used within research 
and commercial community in addition to military and defence 
organisations. According to (Mokube and Adams, 2007), they add 
tremendous value to research providing a platform to study cyber threats 
and attacks. They may also be suitable for aiding in development of analysis 
and forensic skills. (Spitzner, 2000) provides the instance where honeypot 
was used as a forensic analysis for domain name system (DNS) attack. 
2.3.2 Production Honeypots 
 Production honeypots are used within the environment of a 
organisation to protect the information assets of the organisation and help in 
mitigation of risk (Sadasivam et al., 2005). Unlike research honeypots, they 
have direct values as they provide security to organisation’s production 
resources. As they do not require a large amount of functionality, they are 
not too complex to deploy or maintain and consequently, they are unable to 
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provide a large amount of information regarding the attackers. Their 
primary function is to mirror the production network of the organisation and 
invite attackers to interact with them, so that vulnerabilities of the network 
can be exposed. They are considered to add value to detection of attacks 
rather than prevention of attacks. One the examples of production honeypot 
is Nepenthes (Baecher et al., 2006). 
 
Classification 
of Honeypot 
Categories of 
Honeypot 
Examples Brief Description 
Level of 
Interaction 
Low 
Interaction 
Honeypot 
HoneyD, 
Specter, 
KFSensor, 
MWCollect 
A low-interaction honeypot 
simulates only limited services that 
cannot be exploited enough to gain 
total control of the honeypot. 
High 
Interaction 
Honeypot 
Honeynet, 
Sebek, 
Argos 
High interaction honeypots are 
complex solutions, which include 
deploying of real operating systems 
and applications. 
Purpose of 
Honeypot 
Research 
Honeypot 
Honeynets 
A research honeypot is used to gain 
the information about the attacker’s 
community and does not add any 
direct value to the organisation. 
Production 
Honeypot 
Nepenthes 
Production honeypots are used 
within the environment of an 
organisation to protect the 
information assets of the 
organisation and help in mitigation 
of risk. 
Table 2.1: Classification of honeypots 
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2.4 Monitoring Methods of Honeypots 
 Honeypot monitoring is a very important component of any 
honeypot deployment. There are two methods that used for monitoring of 
honeypots viz. external method (network-based) and internal method (host-
based). In the network-based method, all packets that are sent to or received 
from the monitored honeypot are captured and traffic sniffing tools such as 
TCPDUMP (TCPDUMP, 2012) and Ethereal (Ethereal, 2012). In the host-
based method, specialised sensors are deployed within the honeypot in order 
to monitor and record system events. 
It should be noted that both approaches have their strengths and 
weakness. For instance, the network-based approach though being 
transparent and invisible to the attacker can sniff packets by being deployed 
outside the honeypot but it cannot capture internal system events on a 
vulnerable honeypot. Furthermore, it may be ineffective or perform at lower 
effectiveness, if the network data traffic is encrypted. On the other hand, the 
host-based method, if detected by the attacker can be tampered with, thus 
leaving it ineffective. 
Data capture modules in high interaction honeypots deals with 
collection and recording of all the activities of Honeypot. It deceives the 
intruder by capturing all activity within honeypot without attacker knowing 
about any monitoring i.e. with introduction of decoy systems. 
2.5 Monitoring Methods of Low-Interaction 
Honeypots 
2.5.1 Mwcollect (Malware Collection Tool) 
 Mwcollect (Swanson, 2008) is a low-interaction honeypot. This 
honeypot is installed on top of the operating system. The Mwcollect daemon 
is responsible to open well-known ports often used for purpose of attacking 
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by malware. Simulation of vulnerabilities of the open ports lures attackers 
who would then exploit these ports and send their malware shell codes to 
the Mwcollect daemon. The daemon is responsible for interpreting the shell 
code, parsing the exploited packets and take necessary action to download 
the malware which is then added to the repository for further analysis. 
Additional, shell codes can be written to extend the functionality offered by 
Mwcollect. 
2.5.2 Honeyd 
 Honeyd (Provos, 2003) has been developed by the University of 
Michigan and is a daemon that can used to simulate a large network on a 
single network host. It is a framework for creating virtual honeypots using 
unused IP addresses of a network, which simulates various operating 
systems and services. Honeyd uses arpd tool to route all illegitimate traffic 
to an unused IP address and presumes the every connection made to this 
unused IP address is a candidate for an attack. The virtual hosts 
communicate with the attacker. According to (Provos, 2003), Honeyd is 
simulated at stack level, hence tool such as nmap cannot get fingerprint of 
the honeypot server. The creation of virtual hosts in a configuration file 
allows analyst to open TCP and UDP ports, bind scripts to those ports (if 
required) and bind IP address to a port. The facility to create customised 
scripts and binding them to ports to handle connections is very useful 
functionality for virtual hosts. 
2.6 Monitoring Methods of High-Interaction 
Honeypots 
2.6.1 Sebek 
 Sebek is a high interaction honeypot system that works as follows 
for the purpose of monitoring: 
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• Sebek installs as a loadable hidden kernel module that would capture all 
host activities. As a result of installation, Sebek, replaces a number of 
sensitive system calls in the original operating system. For instance, in 
the latest Sebek development for Linux 11 system calls have been 
replaced viz: sys_open, sys_read, sys_readv, sys_pread64, sys_write, 
sys_writev, sys_pwrite64, sys_fork, sys_vfork, sys_clone, 
sys_socketcall (Jiang and Wang, 2007). The hashtable for system calls is 
updated / hijacked by Sebek with its own system handlers as shown in 
Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3: Instance of modified sys_read system call after 
loading of Sebek 
• Upon successful replacement of system calls by Sebek, it would 
intercept any subsequent invocations of above mentioned system calls 
and capture the arguments as well as any context information such as 
PID. After capturing, Sebek invokes system call handlers and execute 
the system call together with passed arguments in order to complete 
requested service call. 
• All collected information about invoked replaced system calls would be 
sent to remote Sebek server so that it can analysed in real time or saved 
for later analysis. 
Figure 2.4, shows the Sebek based approach to honeypot monitoring. 
For the purpose of monitoring the malicious activity in the honeypot, the 
internal sensors like Sebek need to be transparent and tamper-resistant. 
However, as mentioned before, it case of comprise, attacker may introduce 
anomalies such as (Jiang and Wang, 2007): 
• modification of replaced system call table, 
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• inconsistency in statistics transmitted by honeypot, 
• Unsebek (Corey, 2003) of a honeypot system. 
 
Figure 2.4: Sebek based approach in honeypot monitoring in 
context of HTTP (Source: (Jiang and Wang, 2007)) 
2.6.2 Honeynets 
 Honeynet is a high interaction honeypot developed by The 
Honeynet Project (Project, 2012) in order to capture information on the 
network. The primary purpose of the honeynet is to gather information on 
security issues. It acts as a gateway called Honeywall, by collecting data 
from and to the honeypots on the network. 
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Figure 2.5: Honeywall architecture (Source: (Project, 2012)) 
 Figure 2.5, shows the honeywall gateway that forms the main part 
of the Honeynet and work by capturing all the traffic entering or leaving the 
honeypot network. It separates the honeypots victims from rest of the 
network. According to (Meijerink and Spellen, 2006), it can be configured 
as layer 2 or layer 3 routing gateway, however layer 2 configuration is 
preferred as in bridge mode it is difficult to be detected by the attackers as 
the gateway would not have any IP address associated with itself. A highly 
controlled network where every packet entering or leaving is monitored, 
captured, and analysed consists of data control, data capture and data 
collection. 
• Data Control: In a scenario where a honeypot deployed within honeynet 
is compromised, honeynet have to contain all the activities and ensure 
that production systems are not harmed in anyway. It should be ensured 
that all traffic can flow in and out of honeynet without attackers 
detecting control activities (Meijerink and Spellen, 2006). 
• Data Capture: This part captures all activities within the honeynet and 
the data entering and leaving the honeynet without attacker knowing that 
they are being monitored. All the activities of the attacker are logged 
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and the captured data is analysed to understand vulnerabilities and 
motives of the attacker. 
• Data Collection: All captured data is forwarded to a centralised data 
collection point. This facilitates captured data to be collected, analysed 
and archived at one location. 
2.6.3 Argos 
 Argos (Portokalidis et al., 2006)is a high interaction honeypot that 
is based on Qemu (Bellard, 2005). Qemu is a fast machine emulator for 
various CPUs including x86, PowerPC, ARM and Sparc and on hosts 
including x86, PowerPC, ARM, Sparc, Alpha and MIPS (Bellard, 2005). 
Argos is known for fingerprinting zero-day attacks for instance worms and 
other malware without a requirement for any user input (Portokalidis et al., 
2006). 
As seen in Figure 2.6, all the incoming network traffic is logged into 
the network trace database and concurrently sent to an unmodified 
application running on top of the operating that is based on Qemu fast 
emulator. The emulator uses dynamic taint analysis to check a vulnerability 
that is being exploited in order to change control flow of the application. 
This is achieved by tagging all the data originating from unsafe source as 
tainted, track this tainted data during execution and prevent usage of tainted 
data in addition to its identification. All locations where the tainted data is 
copied i.e. memory or registers are also tagged as tainted locations. Argos 
can raise an alarm whenever instructions such as call, ret, jmp, longjmp etc. 
are invoked. Upon alarm, Argos starts by dumping all tainted blocks as well 
as information indicating all addresses that triggered violations into a log 
file. This step is known as signature creation process. In addition, extra 
information such as executable name, open files, used sockets, network 
ports etc. are also gathered as part of forensics. Argos creates the signatures 
based on the collected inputs and sequence of bytes known as flow signature 
that could be submitted to IDS. In addition to creation of signatures, Argos 
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has Sweetbait – a system that correlates collected signatures that have been 
collected at various sites to create the final signature for a malware. 
 
Figure 2.6: High-Level overview of Argos (Source: (Portokalidis 
et al., 2006)) 
2.7 Advantages and Disadvantages of Honeypots 
 Upon understanding about background and detection of honeypots, 
following distinct advantages have been realised as compared to other 
security systems (Project, 2012):  
• Small Data Sets: Honeypots are always interested in the traffic that 
arrived to them rather than the traffic overload that is generally observed 
in production systems, where it is difficult and complex task to 
differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate packets. Overall, it 
collects small data sets of high value. 
• Catch new attacks, false negatives: As honeypots capture everything 
arriving to them, they are capable of catching new tactics and attack 
methods which may previously be considered false negatives. 
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• Work in encrypted or IPv6 environments: Honeypots have been tested to 
work with encrypted traffic as well as have scaled to IPv6 environments. 
• Minimal Resources: As only limited data is captured, a high-end set of 
resources is not required in case of honeypots. It is a simple concept that 
requires minimal resources. 
Some of the disadvantages associated with honeypots as compared 
to other security system / approaches are as follows (Project, 2012): 
• Limited field of View (Microscope): It is inherent to honeypots that the 
only activity or data captured by them is when the attacker directly 
interacts with them. Attacks happening on the other parts of honeypot 
network is unknown to a particular honeypot.  
• Risk (mainly high-interaction honeypots): Though unlikely in low-
interaction honeypots but in case high interaction honeypots, as the 
deployment of a real operating systems and applications is committed, in 
scenarios of compromise, parts of production network may be attacked 
that could be a major concern for an organisation. 
2.8 Intrusion Detection Systems 
2.8.1 Overview 
Intrusion is described as an attack or attempt to sidestep security 
mechanisms of computer or networks, or compromising the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability (CIA) (Bace and Mell, 2001). Weber (1998) 
categorized attacks into 5 classes: Denial-of-Service (DoS), Probing attacks, 
User to Root (U2R) attacks, Remote to Local (R2L) attacks, and Data 
attacks.  In the first class, computing resources are overwhelmed by 
attackers in order to handle legitimate users’ requests (Labib, Vemuri, 
2008). Probing is described by Paliwal and Gupta (2012) saying: 
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 "an attack in which the hacker scans a machine or a networking 
device in order to determine weaknesses or vulnerabilities that may later 
be exploited so as to compromise the system" 
 U2R attack is defined as an attempt by hackers exploiting 
weaknesses in the system in order to obtain root user privileges. R2L attack 
is an attempt from a remote machine to get unauthorized local access. In the 
last class, malicious code is injected in data looking normal that passes 
firewalls to attack and destroy systems. 
According to SANS Institute (2001), the intrusion detection process 
is involved in observing and analysing user and system activity, reviewing 
both system configurations and vulnerabilities, evaluating the stability of 
critical system and data file, reporting abnormal activities, and carrying out 
system audit. This process is carried out by a software application or 
hardware system.  There are three components for intrusion detection 
systems; Network Intrusion Detection system, Network Node Intrusion 
detection system, and Host Intrusion Detection System.  The first 
component (NIDS) is in charge of scanning traffic from and to all machines 
over the network (Bradley, 2014). The second component (NNIDS) is 
responsible for examining and analysing traffic directed from the network to 
a specific host (SANS, 2001). The last component (HIDS) checks incoming 
and outgoing packets from a host only and notifies users or administrator of 
suspicious activities (Bradley, 2014). 
There is a common mistake that intrusion detection and prevention 
systems are considered as alternatives for a firewall. Although they are used 
in the context of network security, they are totally different. Both are used in 
conjunction to improve a network security. Hassan (2011) explained this 
difference in a very simple form saying: 
 "We can think a firewall as security personnel at the gate and an 
IDS device is a security camera after the gate" 
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A firewall is used to prevent intrusion between networks by 
restricting the access between them but it is not used to report or find attacks 
or threats inside networks. On the other hand, IDS is responsible for finding 
and reporting unwanted entries to the system. 
2.8.2 Detection methodologies 
Intrusion detection methodologies are categorized into three types; 
signature based detection (SD), Anomaly-based detection (AD), and stateful 
protocol analysis (SPA). The first methodology (SD) defines a pattern that 
matches a particular attack. This methodology is very effective to find 
known attacks or threats. However, it is not easy to keep patterns up to date.  
In addition to this, this methodology is not effective in detecting unknown 
threats or attacks (Liao et al. 2012).  On the other hand, the second type 
(AD) is very effective in finding new vulnerabilities. AD works on the basis 
of defining the network behaviour (profile). Then, the defined profile is 
compared with monitored events and activities to detect significant attacks. 
The main disadvantage of this methodology is its high dependency on 
profile definition, not well-defined profiles can lead to weak accuracy in 
detecting attacks or threats (Jyothsna et al. 2011).  The third category (SPA) 
works similarly to AD but with generic profiles defined by vendors. Those 
preloaded profiles are related to specific protocols. Therefore, the system 
will be able to find unexpected sequences of commands like issuing a 
command repeatedly (Scarfone and Mell, 2007).  However, it will not be 
able to cease attacks behaving as benign protocol (Liao et al. 2012). The 
table 2.2 summarizes advantages and disadvantages of each methodology. 
By looking at pros and cons of the IDS methodologies mentioned 
above, we will find that providing more effective detection for attacks or 
threats can be achieved by using hybrid methodologies. For example, using 
SD and AD together will provide a system that can detect both known 
unknown attacks (Liao et al. 2012) 
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Signature based 
detection Anomaly-based detection Stateful protocol analysis 
Advantages 
Efficient in finding known attacks or threats 
Effective in discovering new vulnerabilities 
The system will be preloaded with generic profiles created by vendors. 
Disadvantages 
Difficulties in keeping patterns up to date. Not effective in detecting new vulnerabilities 
Its effectiveness is highly dependent on profile definition. 
Cannot detect attacks behaving as benign protocol 
Table 2.2: Advantages and disadvantages of IDS methodologies (Liao et 
al. 2012) 
2.8.3  Limitations of Intrusion Detection Systems 
 IDS play an important role in finding possible attacks or threats and 
have a significant positive impact in security infrastructure. However, it is 
not an answer to all issues related to security as there are some limitations. 
One of those limitations is inability to trace and analyze all traffic on highly 
loaded or busy networks (SANS Institute, 2001). Therefore, the system may 
not be able to provide an instantaneous report for attacks or threats in such 
scenarios. It is also reported on the same paper (SANS, 2001) that IDS does 
not help if there is weakness in a network protocol, or in the absence of 
strong identification and authentication mechanism. 
Another limitation addressed by Rebecca and Mell (2001) is lacking 
the capability of conducting investigation in the absence of human 
interaction. They also mentioned that it is not effective in dealing with 
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switched networks.  A study conducted by Excamilla and Terry in 1998 
reported a number of issues with IDS. One of those issues is that some IDS 
do not provide verification for the checksum field in the IP header. This 
shortcoming gives hackers a chance to manipulate this field. As a result, the 
system will record different information than what it should receive. 
Moreover, it was found that IDSs are not cheap solutions as it consumes 
different types of resources during both setup and monitoring phases. In 
addition, it demands high level of technical and organizational expertise. In 
spite of the requirements of a lot of resources and expertise, it is not simple 
to trace the improvement in security processes (Werlinger et al. 2008). A 
common complaint reported is that IDS can generate enormous number of 
alerts while the majority of those alerts are false positive (Ho, et al. 2012). 
2.8.4 IDS Tools 
SNORT tool is a widely used source network intrusion prevention 
and detection system built by Source fire. It is an example of signature 
based IDS. Numerous researchers have evaluated the performance of this 
tool.  One example of such a study carried out by Rani and Singh (2014) 
concluded that SNORT managed to find 12 signatures one of them is ICMP 
PING attack having the max numbers of alerts reported by SNORT. 
Another study (Salah et al. 2011) carried out to evaluate the performance of 
SNORT when using Windows 7 and Windows 2008 server, reported the 
following:  
"Setting the scheduling priority to favour either kernel processing 
or user applications has little or no impact on SNORT’s performance 
under both normal and malicious traffic."  
 Although they obtained good results with SNORT, they reported 
that its performance is affected by heavy network traffic and this is one of 
IDS limitations mentioned above. Although SNORT is very popular over 
other products, easy to deploy, has a wide community support, and can run 
on most operating systems, other tools have some advantages over SNORT 
   29 
that need to be considering when selecting an IDS/IPS. One of those tools is 
Suricata which can run multi threads while SNORT can run a single thread, 
supporting multi-thread gives Suricata the advantage of using more than one 
CPU. Kachal and Shevade (2012) said about this advantage:  
"Suricata has the advantage that it can grow to accommodate 
increased network traffic without requiring multiple instances. SNORT is 
lightweight and fast but limited in its ability to scale beyond 200-300 Mbps 
network bandwidth per instance" 
Despite of having this advantage over SNORT, the multi-thread 
architecture consumes more memory and CPU usage as reported by Albin 
(2011) in his comparative analysis of SNORT and Suricata. 
BRO is another IDS tool that is worth to be looked at. Mehra (2012) 
enumerated some advantages of BRO over SNORT in her brief study and 
comparison of SNORT and BRO. One of those advantages she mentioned is 
the ability of Bro to operate effectively on high-speed networks while 
SNORT does not work perfectly on high-speed networks. In addition to this 
advantage, it was reported in that study that the Bro signatures are more 
sophisticated than the signatures used in SNORT. On the other hand, it was 
found that BRO is difficult to deploy compared to SNORT. Moreover, BRO 
can run only in UNIX environment while SNORT can run in most popular 
operating systems.  
2.8.5 Evaluation Metrics of IDSs 
According to (Lazarevic et al., 2003, Zanero and Savaresi, 2004), 
anomaly detection rate and false alarm rate are the best measures that can be 
used for evaluation of IDSs. Clearly, the detection rate is equivalent to 
efficiency and the false alarm rate refers to effectiveness of IDSs. The 
anomaly detection rate is the ratio of number of detected intrusions to the 
total number of intrusions that were introduced into the network traffic as 
show in the equation below (Ertoz et al., 2004). 
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𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 =  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝
 
Where 
True Positive: Malicious traffic correctly classified by IDS. 
False Negative: Malicious traffic incorrectly classified by IDS. 
All Alarms: True positives plus false negatives. 
It is clear from the equation that as the value of efficiency 
approaches 1 (more capable of detecting illegitimate traffic), IDS becomes 
more efficient. While, false alarm rate refers to the false-positive rate of 
IDSs i.e. number of legitimate network traffic that have been analysed by 
IDS as intrusions as shown in the equation below (Ertoz et al., 2004). 
    𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 =  𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
 
Where 
True Positive: Malicious traffic correctly classified by IDS. 
False Positive: Normal traffic incorrectly classified as malicious. 
All Positives: True positives plus false positives. 
This effectively refers to all anomalies that have not been detected 
by the IDS. In addition to, efficiency and effectiveness, (Sommers et al. 
2004), further added two metrics viz. central processing unit (CPU) 
utilisation and packet loss. These measures are useful with regard to 
evaluation of IDS in terms of handling traffic load. 
2.8.6 Offline Evaluation 
According to (Lippmann et al., 2000, Mahoney and Chan, 2003), 
another method of evaluating IDSs is the method where datasets of network 
traffic that includes attacks is used for evaluation without requirement to 
create the network topology. It is the use of tools such as TCPDUMP that 
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are used for such evaluation. The common datasets available for the purpose 
of evaluation of IDSs include the data set created by Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in 1998 and 1999 known as 1998 
DARPA set and 1999 DARPA set. 
DARPA sets are simulations of network traffic that include attacks 
thus offering blind evaluation material for researchers (Mahoney and Chan, 
2003). According to (Lippmann et al., 2000), these data sets have been 
captured at border of network on external router interface, hence are not 
filtered or subjected to any intrusion detection techniques. 
Figure 2.7 shows the conceptual view of DARPA evaluation test 
bed.  The 1998 DARPA set includes 7 weeks of labelled data and 2 weeks 
of unlabelled data where approximately 300 instances of 38 different attacks 
exist. The 1999 DARPA has approximately 5 million connections over 5 
weeks out of which 3 weeks include attack vectors. Table 2.3 shows 
categories of various attacks within DARPA set (Lippmann et al., 2000). 
 
Figure 2.7: Conceptual view of DARPA evaluation test bed that 
create 1000’s of virtual hosts and 100’s of users to simulate a small Air 
Force base separated by router from the Internet (Source: (Lippmann 
et al., 2000)) 
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The advantage of DARPA sets is that it enables fast trial runs for 
evaluation of IDS. Furthermore, these trial runs are also identical as the data 
set used for evaluation of IDSs is same. From researcher’s perspective, it 
saves them important resources and time as they are not required to collect 
data sets as these DARPA sets are free to use. However, some of the 
shortcomings of using these data sets have been highlighted in (Nikolova 
and Jecheva, 2011, McHugh, 2000, Mell et al., 2003) as follows: 
1. Network topology used for collection of these data sets is too simple. 
2. The target systems are small in number. 
3. Low background traffic. 
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 Solaris SunOS Linux Cisco Router 
Denial of 
Service 
Apache2 
Back 
Mailbomb 
Neptune 
Ping of death 
Process table 
Smurf 
Syslogd 
Udp-storm 
Apache2 
Back 
Land 
Mailbomb 
Neptune 
Ping of death 
Process table 
Smurf 
Udp-storm 
Apache2 
Back 
Mailbomb 
Neptune 
Ping of death 
Process table 
Smurf 
Teardrop 
Udp-storm 
 
Remote to 
Local 
Dictionary 
ftp-write 
guest 
http-tunnel 
phf 
xlock 
xsnoop 
Dictionary 
ftp-write 
guest 
phf 
xlock 
xsnoop 
Dictionary 
ftp-write 
guest 
imap 
named 
phf 
sendmail 
xlock 
xsnoop 
Snmp-get 
User to Root 
At 
Eject 
Ffbconfig 
Fdformat 
Ps 
Loadmodule 
Perl 
Xterm 
 
Surveillance / 
Probing 
Ip sweep 
Mscan 
Nmap 
Saint 
Satan 
Ipsweep 
Mscan 
Nmap 
Saint 
satan 
Ipsweep 
Mscan 
Nmap 
Saint 
Satan 
Ipsweep 
Mscan 
Nmap 
Saint 
Satan 
 
Table 2.3: Attack types in evaluation data set (Source: 
(Lippmann et al. 2000)) 
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2.8.7 Online Evaluation 
Upon considering the shortcomings presented by (McHugh, 2000) in 
context of offline evaluation of IDSs, it has become important to generate 
data sets that include realistic network traffic as well as attack vectors. 
Another tool form Lincoln Labs called as Lincoln Adaptable Real-time 
Information Assurance Testbed (LARIAT) is capable of generating realistic 
background traffic as well as generate real network attacks (Rossey et al., 
2002, Allen, 2007). It has been created in order to answer the shortcomings 
of DARPA sets, where objective has been to support real-time evaluation 
and a test bed that is configurable as well as easily deployable. LARIAT 
simulates both internal and external network traffic making it possible for 
IDS evaluation in both network environments. Another two tools namely 
Harpoon and Malicious Traffic Composition Environment (MACE) 
developed by (Sommers et al., 2004) are similar to LARIAT. Harpoon is 
used for generating flow-level network traffic based on real network packet 
traces while MACE is performance benchmarking and malicious traffic 
generating tool (Sommers et al., 2005, Sommers et al., 2006). Table 2.4 
shows taxonomy of MACE exploits (Sommers et al., 2005).. According to 
(Lo et al., 2010, Sommers et al., 2006), a new release of tool that combines 
Harpoon, MACE and best features of DARPA set called Trident has number 
of additional features that are useful for evaluation of IDSs. Table 2.5 shows 
the list of Trident tools for NIDS performance evaluation (Sommers et al. 
2006). 
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Host Based 
Network Based 
Application  Level Transport Level 
Worms Backdoors DoS Fragmentation 
Other 
DoS 
Welchia 
Nimda 
CodeRed2 
Blaster 
Dameware 
Sasser 
Mydoom 
Sdbot 
winnuke 
Rose 
Teardrop1 
Teardrop2 
Bonk 
Nestea 
Oshare 
Synflood 
Pod 
Land 
jolt 
Smurf Fraggle 
Table 2.4: Taxonomy of MACE exploits (Source: (Sommers et al., 
2005)) 
Name Description 
Attack-replay A flow replay tool that allows two-way replay of a packet trace. 
Autom-gen A script that stores service descriptions and generates service-specific automata for Harpoon. 
Exec-grom A traffic grooming algorithm that uses trust heuristics to separate benign traffic from suspicious traffic. 
Payload-gen A tool that reads a groomed packet trace and outputs packet pools that corresponds to automata states. 
Payload-sanitize A tool that sanitizes inconsistencies in protocol headers that are introduced due to interleaving. 
Split-darpa A script to separate malicious DARPA traffic from benign based on labels. 
Harpoon plugin A traffic generation plugin for Harpoon that executes the service description automata to produce application payload traffic. 
Table 2.5: Trident tools developed for NIDS performance 
evaluation (Source: (Sommers et al. 2006)) 
(Gadelrab et al., 2007) and (Saber et al., 2011) have presented 
framework for defining test scenarios. (Saber et al., 2011) has argued in the 
paper that current classification of attacks do not cover of requirements of 
evaluating IDSs. They have provided framework for covering all 
characteristics of attacks in order to have complete evaluation. 
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2.9 Data Mining 
2.9.1 Overview 
Data mining is defined as the process aiming to find useful 
information from large data sets (Tan, Steinbach, Kumar, 2006). Grossman 
(1997) defined data mining in a more descriptive definition saying:  
"Concerned with uncovering patterns, associations, changes, 
anomalies, and statistically significant structures and events in data" 
 Based on those definitions, we can consider data mining as an 
analytical tool that helps users to look at data from different angles in order 
to categorize them. 
Data mining is used in many different applications. One of those 
applications is intrusion detection. Reddy and Rajulu (2011) reported that 
data mining can have a great contribution in helping IDS to focus on 
malicious activities and real attack by removing normal activities from 
alarm data. They also added that it can play an important role in identifying 
bad sensor signatures or false alarm generators 
Gabra, Baha-Eldin, and Korshi (2014) reported that they managed to 
reduce number of irrelevant alerts by 99.9% when they used of one of data 
mining based method for classifications. Another research that aimed to 
enhance IDS alarm quality by using a new data mining technique concluded 
that using this technique reduced the alarm load by 82% (Al-Mamory, 
Zhang, 2008). The idea of this technique is to produce clusters and 
categorize alarms, then each cluster abstracted as a generalized alarm. The 
generalized alarms linked to root causes are transformed to filters in order to 
decrease alarms load in the future. Different data mining techniques will be 
discussed in more detail in next sections.  
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2.9.2 Data mining limitations 
Despite of the promising results mentioned above, Phung (2000) 
reported that building an effective solution using data mining faces some 
obstacles. One of those obstacles is the massive increase in the amount and 
complexity of data to be analysed, this issue makes data mining quite 
expensive in terms of computation. Data mining in this case may consume a 
lot of CPU and memory resources that are expensive or not available. Phung 
also added that carrying out analysis on network traffic using a sample of 
the data and not all of them for the purpose of generating profiles may cause 
false conclusions.  
2.9.3 Genetic algorithms  
Genetic algorithm is considered as machine learning method based 
on the principles of evolutionary computation (Reddy, 2011). Genetic 
algorithm has been used in many different applications with promising 
result. In the context of intrusion detection, Kumar and Guyal (2004) said:  
"They incorporate the concept of Darwin’s theory and natural 
selection to generate a set of rules that can be applied on a testing set to 
classify intrusions".  
Mujahid  and Mathew (2014) discussed the advantages of genetic 
algorithm in their research about this technique. One of those advantages is 
its capability to find a solution for any optimization problem. In addition, 
they reported that it is capable of handling multiple solution search spaces.  
Many researchers applied genetic algorithms in intrusion detection 
research area with very high success rate. One of the researches in the area 
of network anomaly detection used both multi-agent and genetic algorithm 
(Crosbie, Spafford, 1995).  Another research that combines two techniques; 
genetic algorithm and fuzzy data mining was conducted by Bridges and 
Vaughn (2000). A hybrid algorithm developed by Castro and Zubin (2002) 
to achieve the optimization of intrusion detection by using both of support 
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vector machines and genetic algorithm. Genetic algorithms were used by 
Goyal and Kumar to identify and classify different types of attack 
connections, they succeeded in lowering false positive rate to 0.2%. Another 
genetic algorithm model, that achieved a low false rat, was developed by 
Chittur (2001).  
Although genetic algorithm achieved promising results in the 
research area of intrusion detection, Majeed and Kumar (2014) addressed 
some limitations in their survey about genetic algorithm in intrusion 
detection systems. One of those limitations is the complexity to propose a 
problem space.  They also added that selecting the optimal parameters for 
genetic algorithm is not a simple process. In addition, it was mentioned in 
this survey that systems based on genetic algorithms are not easy to 
configure. Moreover, that survey reported that it is required to have a local 
searching technique in conjunction with genetic algorithm for effective 
functioning. 
2.9.4 Artificial Neural Network 
It is a computational model based on the principles of 
animal's central nervous systems. This model has the capabilities of machine 
learning as well as pattern recognition.  Anthony (2014) described it as a 
system that adapts its structure in the learning phase; this adoption is based 
on external or internal information flowing through the system.  There are 
two types of neural network algorithms; supervised and unsupervised 
training algorithms.  The first algorithm learns expected output for a specific 
input. The most common used architecture of type is Multi-Level 
Perceptron (MLP). This architecture is widely used in solving pattern 
recognition problems. On the other hand, unsupervised training algorithms 
can learn without the need to specify expected output. One of most popular 
unsupervised algorithms exploited in solving classification problems is Self-
Organizing Maps (SOM).   
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The concept of neural network, adaptive learning, attracted many 
researchers to work in the area of using neural network in intrusion 
detection. Some tests using neural network were made by Lippmann and 
Cunningham (2000) at MIT Lincoln Laboratory.  Multi-Level Perceptron 
(one of neural network structures) is used to find host attacks, and attacks 
that try to get root-privilege on a server by looking at specific keywords 
linked to attacks on network traffic. By applying that approach, they 
managed to reduce false alarms by two orders of magnitude. They also 
reported that they managed to raise the detection rate to around 80 % with 
the DARPA data base.  This approach is able to catch old as well as new 
attacks not contained in the training data sets. Another research that 
exploited MLP was conducted Ghosh and Schwartzbard (2000). They 
reported that when they had applied MLP to anomaly detection, they obtain 
good result, 77% of attacks were detected and 3% of alarms were 
categorized as false alarms. On the other side, they obtained high false rate 
when they applied MLP on misuse detection. Girardin employed SOM to 
carry out clustering of network traffic and detect attacks. His approach 
managed to catch IP spoofing, FTP password guessing, and network 
scanning.  Kukiełka and Kotulski (2009) concluded in their research about 
adaptation of the neural network-based IDS to new attacks detection that 
neural networks in their experiments succeeded to classify the network 
traffic similar to the traffic presented in the learning stage. On the other 
hand, it did not manage with a good accuracy to classify new attacks and 
new normal traffic that are different than the traffic existed during the 
training phase. 
2.9.5 Naive Bayes 
This technique is considered as a simple probalistic classifier based 
on Bayesian probability model. Its simplicity comes from that it estimates 
the class probabilities by assuming that features or attributes are 
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conditionally independent (Tan et al. 2005). Panda and Parta (2007) 
described naive bayes classifier saying: 
 "The naïve Bayes classifier operates on a strong independence 
assumption. This means that the probability of one attribute does not 
affect the probability of the other" 
 Amor et al. (2004) mentioned in their research (Naive Bayes vs. 
Decision Trees in intrusion detection systems) that the main advantage of 
this technique is its simple structure. This simplicity helps in constructing 
the mode incrementally. As a result, it will be easy to be updated. On the 
other side, its performance is very poor with some datasets that have a 
strong dependency between features due to the strong independence relation 
assumption that is not always true in the real world (Ji, Yu, Zhang, 2011). 
Panda and Patra (2007) carried out some tests in network intrusion 
detection exploiting naive bayes classifier. They reported that testing the 
system they developed using 10% KDDCup’99 data set achieved 95% 
detection rate. In addition, the model was built in very short time (1.98 sec). 
However, they noticed that it generates false positives with a higher rate 
compared to propagation neural network. Another experiment aiming to 
improve intrusion detection by employing naive bayes was run by Taruna 
and Hiranwal (2013). They reported that the system they proposed managed 
to increase the balance detection rates for 4 attack classes; DoS, U2R, R2L, 
and probe. They also reported that the system also generates false positive at 
acceptable level. Sagane and Dhande obtained similar results when they 
followed a similar approach (2014).  
2.9.6 Decision Tree 
Decision tree Classifier is known as a simple and popular technique 
employed in solving classification problems. It is defined as (Prediction 
Works, 2011):  
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"A predictive modelling technique from the fields of machine 
learning and statistics that builds a simple tree-like structure to model the 
underlying pattern of data"  
 Markey (2011) enumerated advantages of decision tree over other 
classification techniques, one of the main advantages is that it generates a 
set of rules which are transparent, easy to understand, and easily employed 
into real-time technologies as Intrusion Detection systems. However, 
Rokach and Mimon (2014) pointed out that this technique works only with 
target attributes having discrete values. They also said: 
 “The greedy characteristic of decision trees leads to another 
disadvantage that should be pointed out. This is its over–sensitivity to the 
training set, to irrelevant attributes and to noise".   
Bouzida and Cuppens (2008) compared the results obtained when 
testing intrusion detection based on decision tree with the results obtained 
when using neural network. They concluded that employing decision tree in 
intrusion detection are more effective in detecting new attacks compared to 
neural network. Jain and Upendra (2012) proposed a model based on an 
enhanced version of C4.5 decision tree in order to detect attacks. They 
tested the proposed model on 10% of KDD data set and found that it catches 
attack with 96.9% accuracy.  Another experiment employing C4.5 decision 
tree algorithm carried out by Bidgoli, Analoui, Rezvani, and Shahhoseini 
(2008) showed that the proposed system managed to detect probe attack 
with 100% accuracy, it was also able to detect DOS attacks with accuracy 
tending to 100%. On the other hand, the system detects U2R and R2L with 
low accuracy. Abbes, Bouhoula, and Rusinowitch (2004) used protocol 
analysis approach based on decision tree to solve the false negative issue 
occurring in pattern matching processes. Kailashiya and Jain (2012) 
developed a model based on decision tree in conjunction with  stratified 
weighted sampling. They tested their proposed system using KDD cup 
dataset and found that they obtained a good accuracy rate at 93.85% and 
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error rate at 3.92%. Makkithaya, Reddy, and Acharya (2008) proposed a 
fragmentation based c-fuzzy decision tree model. Their goal in their 
research was improving the performance   by selecting more suitable data 
set and decreasing the number features. They reported that the results they 
obtained proved that the model could be used to build an effective intrusion 
detection system.   
2.9.7 K Means 
K Means is a clustering technique that partitions data objects into K 
clusters dependant on their feature values. Tan et al. (2006) explained K 
Means saying:  
"k-means defines a prototype in terms of a centroid, which is 
usually the mean of a group of points, and is typically applied to objects in 
a continuous n-dimensional space".  
This clustering technique is very simple to understand and to be 
employed in implementing solutions that solve clustering problems (Vora, 
Oza, 2013). However, Derban and Moldovan (2006) reported some 
disadvantages that may represent obstacles in obtaining optimal solutions to 
when using K Means clustering technique. One of those disadvantages is 
that the algorithm is not capable of specifying the number of clusters (K), 
this means that there is a need to set this number of by users. This also 
means that users need to carryout experiments with different number of 
clusters to obtain the best results. Another shortcoming mentioned by 
Derban and Moldovan is that there is a high dependency on initial centroids 
in partitioning data objects. 
Singh (2010) conducted a research on intrusion detection using K 
Mean algorithm.  The approach proposed in that research was tested with 
1998 DARPA audit data, the best result was obtained when setting number 
of clusters (K) to 2 with a detection rate tends to 96% and low false positive 
rate.  Wei at el. (2011) developed an enhanced version of K Means 
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algorithm that solves some issues in K Means algorithm. They described 
this algorism saying:  
"In the improved k-means algorithm clustering guiding function is 
introduced. It can help the algorithm determine clustering in direction of 
the high point density" 
 It was found that testing the developed model with KDD 99 
increased the detection rate by 2.94%, it also reduced the false positive rate 
by .76% compared to the K Means algorithm.  
Table 2.6 summarizes advantages and disadvantages of data mining 
techniques mentioned in this chapter. 
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Technique Advantages Disadvantages 
Genetic Algorithm 
- Finding a solution for any 
optimization problem. - Handling multiple solution 
search spaces. 
 
- Complexity to propose 
a problem space. - Complexity to select 
the optimal parameters - The need to have local 
searching technique  
for effective 
functioning 
Artificial Neural Network 
 
- Adapts its structure during 
training without the need to 
program it. 
- Not accurate results 
with test data as with 
training data 
Naive Bayes Classifier 
 
- Very simple structure. - Easy to update. 
- Not effective when 
there are high 
dependency between 
features. 
Decision tree 
- Easy to understand - Easy to implement 
- Works effectively only 
with attributes having 
discrete values. - Very sensitive to 
training sets, irrelevant 
features and noise. 
K Mean 
- Very Easy to understand. - Very simple to implement 
in solving clustering 
problems. 
- Number of clusters is 
not automatically 
calculated. - High dependency on 
initial centroids. 
Table 2.6: Advantages and disadvantages of data mining techniques 
2.9.8 Related Research Works to the first contribution 
One of the most well-known works in context of using data mining for 
intrusion detection is by Axelsson (1999), the model created uses the 
maximised posterior probabilities as parameters, provided by Bayesian 
algorithm. As a result the false alarm rate that is usually shown by IDSs is 
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reduced. In our research the aim has been to create new signatures based on 
reasoning of outlier instances. In other words, our research is complementing 
research work by provision of a reasoning module. 
Another research study conducted by Abraham (2001) uses real-time 
network intrusion detection systems for detection of misuse. It employs 
association rules; characteristic rules and Meta rules to provide results, with 
regard to deviation from normal network activity. 
Lee and Stoflo (2000) outlined a data-mining framework for constructing 
intrusion detection models. The key idea is to first apply data mining 
programs, to audit data to compute frequent patterns, extract features, and 
then use classification algorithms to compute detection models. 
Chang (2007) used the method of back propagation by sample query and 
attribute for intrusion detection, to identify and analyse features of training 
data. The main contribution of that research paper has been a reduction in 
processing time and storage of data instances. 
Perhaps the closest research that has been conducted is by Barbara (2003), 
where a training system was built to classify unknown and false alarm 
instances. Furthermore, Barbara (2003) used and analysed the unknown 
instance by following its audit trail, in order to provide a concrete result, 
informing if the data instance was outlier. Our research is going a step 
further by creating a rule signature whereby an IDS rules holder can be 
updated automatically. 
2.9.9 Related Research Works to the Second Contribution 
A number of researches conducted in the multi stage attacks detection 
area. One of those researches was conducted by Alserhani et al. (2010). The 
proposed correlation framework in that research combines two engines; 
online and offline, and two mechanisms; high quality knowledge-based and 
statistical-based correlation. The online tools receive alerts from IDS then it 
recognizes multistage attacks using defined rules provided by the offline 
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engine. The proposed framework achieved 92% multi stage detection rate 
and 21.8% false positive rate during their lab experiments for 35 multi stage 
attack scenarios.  This approach reduces the computation expenses by 
analysing only alerts received by IDS. However, this massive dependence 
on alerts received by IDS may lead to missing capturing attacks in case of 
not receiving alerts. Another research that follows event correlation 
approach was carried out by Spadaro (2011). In that research, false alerts 
were reduced by combining both signature and anomaly based IDS to 
remove redundant events. In addition, some classifiers were trained with 
different attack categories to carry out an early classification for the logged 
security events. Moreover, meta data is combined with event data to reduce 
false positive rate. 
Other efforts made by Templeton (2010), they proposed a system that 
follows Attack scenario construction approach. This approach is based on 
associating two security incidents, it tries to find consequences of one 
incident and prerequisites of the incident that may occur later. The strength 
point of this approach is the ability to construct new attacks created by a 
mixture of known attacks can be detected. On the other hand, attacks cannot 
be tracked without finding causes and effects of attacks. Moreover, it 
requires large consumption of computer resources. 
 
Another research was carried out by Ourston et al. (2012). The research 
is based on using Hidden Markov Models (HMM).  The idea of using HMM 
is to determine the most likely attack type corresponding to a sequence of 
alerts received by IDS.  This study found that HMM approach achieved 
greater classification accuracy compared to other approached. However, 
they reported that the obtained accuracy was associated with the expense of 
additional computations. 
The proposed methodology in this thesis has an advantage over those 
solutions by not being dependant on receiving alerts from IDS the 
mentioned solutions above. It also does not require a complex computation 
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and memory resources compared to them. In addition, the mentioned 
solution requires an update with sequences of new attacks while the 
proposed system focused on the source of the attack not the attack logic. 
However, this may represent an issue if an attack comes from an IP address 
not classified yet as suspicious. Moreover, the throughput of the proposed 
methodology is relatively low compared to other solutions due to using web 
services that consumes sometime to get IP information. 
2.9.10 Weka data mining tool 
It is a widely used software tool in machine learning written in Java 
and built at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. It includes a large 
number of machine learning and data mining algorithms. This tool has 
become very popular in the academic and industrial fields. This can be run 
on different platforms as it is written in Java programming language. In 
addition, it is free as it is under General Public License (GNU). Moreover, it 
has a graphical user interface which makes it easy to use. Despite of those 
advantages, Weka cannot handle datasets larger than a few megabytes, it 
issues an out of memory error (Naudts, 2004). 
Many researches and studies were conducted to evaluate the 
performance of different algorithms using Weka data mining tools. One of 
those studies, which was carried out by Wahbeh et al. (2013), gives a 
comparative analysis between data Mining Tools over some classification 
methods. They reported the following:  
"According to study the functionality built into to Weka and 
available through add-ons makes the software highly robust for a variety 
of users" 
2.10  Feature selection 
Feature selection is defined as the process of obtaining a subset of 
related attributes or features to be used in constructing a model. In other 
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words, it removes inappropriate, irrelevant or redundant data; this behavior 
can play an important role in improving learning accurateness, and 
recovering result unambiguousness (Kamepalli and Mothukuri, 2014). One 
of widely used feature reduction algorithms is correlation-based feature 
selection where subsets of features are assessed on the basis of the 
hypothesis stated by Hall (1999):  
"Good feature subsets contain features highly correlated with the 
classification, yet uncorrelated to each other"  
Hall also claimed the following in his research about CFS for 
machine learning:  
"Feature selection for classification tasks in machine learning can 
be accomplished on the basis of correlation between features, and that 
such a feature selection procedure can be beneficial to common machine 
learning algorithms" There are also other widely used feature selection 
reduction algorithms such as information gain (IG), gain ratio (GR) and Fast 
Correlation Based Filter (FCBF). Although feature selection techniques 
have a positive impact as mentioned earlier, Batal (2014) pointed out that 
some features that are looked at as irrelevant may be useful when 
associating them with others.  
 Chou (2007) proposed a CFS algorithm to select a subset of most 
relevant features. The result was retrieving six data sets from UCI databases 
and an intrusion detection benchmark data set, and DARPA KDD99. Those 
data sets are then used to train and test C4.5 and naive bayes algorithms. 
They reported that the proposed approach achieved the highest averaged 
accuracies compared to CFS and FCBF. Chae and Choi (2014) developed a 
feature selection method based on attribute ratio that uses attribute average 
of total and each class data. The results of experiments conducted in that 
research showed that there is that between accuracy and attribute ratio value. 
They reported that the highest accuracy (99.794%) was achieved when 22 
features were used. 
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2.11 Discussion 
So far, several papers have been published to address the security 
threats (Meijerink and Spellen, 2006, Singh and Joshi, 2011). But none of 
these solutions, neither antivirus nor firewalls, can totally prevent these 
attacks. Therefore, the design of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that is 
facilitated by honeypots that is expected to detect and mitigate threats and 
attacks on production networks has become a priority for researchers. Such 
system would not only allow production networks to protect themselves 
from security threats but would also autonomously create evidence for 
forensics analysis in case of attack. 
The honeypots analysed have the capability to record and monitor 
network activity (legitimate or illegitimate). Though the logs are mere 
collection of the network activity and require forensic / network data analyst 
to analyse the logged data. Honeyd and Mwcollect (low-interaction 
honeypots) have ability using configuration files to emulate vulnerabilities 
associated with certain open ports. Honeynet and Argos do not emulate 
vulnerabilities and are real operating systems with real services where 
methods include data control, data capture and data collection in case of 
Honeywall and signature creation of tainted malware based on various 
inputs. 
Literature for honeypots and intrusion detection systems as isolated 
subject has been focus of many research works. However, researchers have 
not invested effort into facilitation of IDS using honeypots to secure 
production networks. Much progress has been made within IDS for purpose 
of detecting known attack vectors. However, little has been made in the area 
specifically related to use of high interaction systems for autonomously 
updating IDSs. Honeypots or monitored honeynet networks can be used for 
the purpose of (Mokube and Adams, 2007): 
1. Defensive distraction system in order to direct an attacker towards 
machines containing no valuable information;  
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2. An early warning system that can inform about exploitation trends to 
IDS; and  
3. A data collection store that can be used to examine the methods and 
processes of exploitation of a honeypot in order to create forensic 
reports, when required. 
Issues with IDS in terms of quality include metrics of effectiveness, 
adaptability and extensibility (Nazer and Selvakumar, 2012). An IDS can be 
effective, if it has high intrusion detection i.e. large rate of true positives 
(ability to realise that the certain network activity is actually an attack) as 
well as if it has low rate of false positives (ability to realise that a given 
network activity is not an attack and considered normal network activity). 
Generally, this is achieved by creation of rules by the expert based on 
domain knowledge and / or analysis of logged network data making it a very 
complex process (Kayacik et al., 2012). An IDS can be adaptable, if it can 
detect variations in previously known exploits and update the rules 
seamlessly in order to prevent intrusion. The literature has indicated various 
intrusion detection methods but none has been found to be adaptable where 
unknown attacks that are “child of” known attacks can be realised 
autonomously (Amro et al., 2012). An IDS can be extensible, if it allows 
integration of additional modules or updating / customisation of existing 
modules by the administrator. According to (Nazer and Selvakumar, 2012), 
customisation in current IDS is difficult as expert rules and statistical 
measures as environment specific. 
It has been realised that in addition to issues listed above, the gap 
between collection of network data and creation of rule / signature is not 
only large in terms of temporal terms (i.e. the time it takes to create a new 
signature that would be informed to IDS) but also in terms of automated 
intelligent data analysis tools that could upon analysis create signatures with 
high true positive and low false positive rates. Honeypots are not solutions 
for intrusion detection and hence they do not have production value. The 
only value that is offered by them is that they help with data collection and 
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provide initial set of data so that intelligent rules can be created that can 
prevent intrusions on network or organisational assets. The topic honeypot 
has been discussed in this chapter, as it was possible solution of data 
collection. The objective was to use actual live data for the purpose of 
research study however, due to filtering (possibly offered by an Internet 
Service Provider (ISP)), the amount of attacks on vulnerable resource was 
minimal and the most that was received on resource was DNS queries that 
were unimportant. Hence, the methodology was altered to use KDD data as 
opposed to data collected from honeypot. 
2.12 Summary 
Currently, the research is focused on study of various high 
interaction honeypot tools as well as capabilities of data capturing tools. The 
focus is now shifting towards creation of an autonomous data analysis tool 
that would be based on data mining techniques and would take input of raw 
data collected as a result of hybrid of host-based and network-based 
monitoring tools. In this chapter, the researcher has provided a concise 
overview on honeypots and their uses. The chapter also discussed various 
classifications and categories of the honeypots namely research, production, 
low-interaction and high interaction honeypots. A detailed description of 
detection methods used in high interaction honeypot systems viz. Sebek, 
Honeynet and Argos as well as preparation of low-interaction honeypot 
system using configuration files has been discussed. Although, honeypots 
have been active area of research for a decade, but they are gaining 
popularity due to degree of analysis tools and capturing and detection 
techniques that are becoming invaluable in the world of cybercrime and 
network forensics. 
 This chapter has also discussed IDS including the difference 
between a firewall and IDS, intrusion detection methodologies, and 
intrusion detection limitations. It also gives a quick look over IDS tools 
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highlighting advantages and disadvantages of each tool.  In addition, this 
chapter has gone through data mining, some techniques used in data mining, 
and how those techniques employed in intrusion detection by different 
researchers to improve the performance of IDS. This part of the thesis has 
also provided an overview about feature selection and how it can have a 
great contribution in helping learning machine algorithms exploited to 
improve the performance of IDS.   
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CHAPTER 3 
_________________ 
MULTI-LAYER CLASSIFICATION 
SYSTEM 
3.1 Introduction 
In the context of information technology, intrusion can be defined as a 
series of attempts in order to compromise security of a network-based 
resource (Liao, 2013). Network-based systems or resources require constant 
monitoring in order to ensure that malicious activity can be contained (Kang, 
Fuller, Hanover, 2005). An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is responsible 
for monitoring network traffic and based on a set of rules raising alerts for 
information security officers, when malicious traffic is detected (Kang, 
Fuller, Hanover, 2005). 
Although IDSs are successful in terms of preventing attacks on network 
resources, they are not adaptable in cases where new attacks are made, i.e. 
they need human intervention for investigating new attacks (Borah, 
Chakraborty, 2011) ( Roesh, 1999). Furthermore, an IDS could become a 
bottleneck, where it is employed on a busy network. IDS requires time for 
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processing network data, before it can be released to a production network 
(Roesh, 1999). 
One possible solution for addressing the above problem is to create a 
system that is based on Machine Learning. This signature-based system will 
use existing IDS, such as SNORT, for comparing packet signatures to rules 
defined by SNORT, and the packets found to be malicious are subjected to 
being passed to an intelligent model that has been trained to detect malicious 
content (Roesh, 1999) (Kim, Lee, Kim, 2014). Hence, SNORT will act as a 
first level of filter reducing the amount of traffic for further investigation 
using the intelligent model. Overall, this reduces the load on SNORT, hence 
providing a reduction in analysis at the SNORT level, and further reducing 
human intervention, as the intelligent trained model is responsible for 
deciding if a certain set of packets are malicious or otherwise. If a set of 
packets are found to be malicious, an automated signature will be created 
that will update the set of rules used by SNORT. 
The novelty is offered by integration of the training model for detecting 
misuse in the incoming network data packets with a reasoning model that is 
applied on outliers (uncategorised data packets) (Kim, Lee, Kim, 2014). The 
result of the reasoning model is in the form of a rule that can then be used by 
an IDS, on a production level system, to filter automatically malicious data 
packets of the type just identified. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a comparative study of classification 
of algorithms for the purpose of creating a training model used for misuse 
detection. In this comparative study we present results in terms of a 
confusion matrix and metrics such as true-positive, false-positive, true-
negatives and false-negatives. Also presented are comparisons between 
expected and predicted classes of KDD’99 (KDD’99, 1999) intrusion 
detection data by a random split of 66% for creation of the training model, 
and 34% for testing of the training model for misuse detection. 
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Section 2 gives an overview of the proposed methodology and Section 3 
provides a description of the KDD’99 intrusion detection data set, discussing 
metrics used for attribute selection in the KDD’99 intrusion detection data 
set. Section 4 discusses the classifier module, providing a brief background 
with regard to classifier algorithms, namely Naïve Bayes and Decision Tree, 
then goes through the experiments results.  Section 5 discusses the reasoning 
module and the experiments that have been conducted, and then discusses 
the results obtained. Section 6 provides a conclusion to this chapter. 
3.2 Classification Approach  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: High Level View of Research Process 
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The research process consists of the following elements   (see Figure 3.1): 
 
• Intrusion Detection System: SNORT will be used in this solution as a 
signature based IDS. In addition to its main functionality as an IDS, it 
will be used as a network sniffing tool that feeds the training model 
with the live traffic.   
• Rule Holder: This contains all signatures used by SNORT to capture 
attacks matching the stored signatures. 
• Data Set and Categorisation: The first step in the research process is to 
find a reliable high quality network traffic data set, where each packet 
has been labelled so that the training model is created, and as a result 
the classification can be used reliably. 
• Feature Selection: The network packets in the data set are then passed 
through an attribute evaluator, in order to extract a set of features that 
can be used effectively to detect intrusions. Non-essential features are 
known to be not only a bottleneck in terms of cost of computation, but 
are also factors that contribute towards increased error rates (Wei, 
Wang, 2011). 
• Classifier Module: This module is responsible for building a classifier 
using Decision Tree and Naïve Bayes that can compute a model using 
the most discriminating features in an instance of a data packet, in 
order to describe a class (concept). This is done by training a 
classifier, using a pruned set of features, where the objective is that 
the model created is more generic than the rules (as compared to 
SNORT) and hence, it outperforms this in accuracy and effectiveness, 
when compared to general rule-based signature matching systems. 
• Training Model: This model is the outcome of the classifier module. 
The results of each classification algorithm will be compared to each 
other then one of them will be selected to be used as the training 
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model. This model will classify the traffic to either known or 
unknown classes. The traffic will be passed to the reasoning module 
in case if it is unknown for further investigation.     
• Reasoning Mechanism: The purpose of this mechanism is to provide 
another stage for classifying the network traffic, if the first stage fails 
to classify it. The reasoning mechanism is based on a hybrid model 
built using neural network (MLP) and fuzzy logic. The outcome of 
this module will be in a form of a signature that will be added to the 
rule base. 
3.3 Data Set – KDD’99 
3.3.1 Overview 
 
The data set used in this chapter is the KDD’99 intrusion detection data 
set. This data set is based on a 1998 DARPA initiative and has been used by 
researchers for evaluation of various intrusion detection methodologies in the 
past. The data are collected as a result of a setup of a fictitious military 
network with a number of target machines running various services. A 
sniffer has been used to record all network data using raw TCP/IP dumps 
(KDD'99, 1999).  
The data set consists of 41 discrete and continuous attributes and has 22 
attack classes and 1 normal class, where each instance in the data set has 
been categorised as one class. 
The attacks are further divided into 4 categories: 
• Denial of Service Attack Category (DoS) where a target host is 
compromised by the request of service from a multitude of machines. 
(e.g. syn flood) 
• User to Root Attack Category (U2R) where an attacker attempts to get 
unauthorised access to root level of a target system. (e.g. buffer 
overflow attacks) 
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• Remote to User Attack Category (R2L) where a hacker tries to take 
control of a remote machine by exploiting vulnerabilities of the 
system.  (e.g. guessing password) 
• Probing Attack Category (probe) where an attacker scans the 
machines (generally on a network) in order to collect useful 
information (for instance, services running) about those machines. 
(e.g. port scanning) 
1.3.2 Features of the Data Set 
For selection of important attributes in the network data set, Correlation-
based Feature Selection (CFS) was employed. A search algorithm, as well as 
a classifier function, is used by CFS to evaluate the importance of each 
feature and provide a subset of features (Hall, 1999). The heuristic that is 
used by CFS describes important features that are highly correlated to the 
class; however they are uncorrelated from each other (Hall, 2009). In a data-
mining context, this approach is based on information gain that measures the 
importance of each attribute for predicting class, based on the calculated 
entropy of that attribute. An attribute with entropy value approaching 0 will 
have information gain approaching 1 (Davis, Clark, 2011).  
𝐻𝐻[𝐷𝐷] =  −  ∑ 𝑃𝑃�𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗� log2 𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗)|𝐶𝐶|𝑗𝑗=1         (1) 
Where C is the desired class 
Information gain by removal of an attribute can be computed as a difference 
of entropy before removal to entropy after removal of that attribute (Davis, 
Clark, 2011).  
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐷𝐷,𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝) = 𝐻𝐻[𝐷𝐷] −  𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝[𝐷𝐷]            (2) 
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Figure 3.2: Attributes selected upon using CFS evaluator and 
depth first search 
3.4 Classifier Module 
3.4.1 Overview 
For misuse detection, we have used two classifiers, namely Naïve Bayes 
and Decision Tree, for creation of a training model. This section provides a 
brief description of each technique. For a more detailed background, the 
reader can study Bhargava (2013) or Rawat and Jain, (2013). 
3.4.2 Naïve Bayes 
Bayesian reasoning is applied to decision-making that deals with 
probabilistic inference, i.e. the knowledge about previous events is used to 
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predict future events (Altwaijry, 2013). In a Naïve Bayes classifier the 
availability or unavailability of a certain attribute is not related to availability 
or unavailability of another attribute.  Naïve Bayes provides an advantage 
when making decisions based on small amounts of training data, to compute 
mean and variance of the attributes in order to compute its class. Bayes 
theorem provides a method of calculating the posterior probability, P(c|x), 
from P(c), P(x), and P(x|c). A Naive Bayes classifier assumes that the effect 
of the value of a predictor (x) on a given class (c) is independent of the 
values of other predictors (Rawat, Jain, 2013). This offers conditional 
independence. Bayes algorithm is explained by the following: 
                                     (3) 
)(*)|(...*)|(*)|()|( 21 cPcxPcxPcxPXcP n=    (4) 
•  is the posterior probability of class given attribute. 
•  is the prior probability of class. 
•  is the likelihood which is the probability of attribute given 
class. 
•  is the prior probability of attribute. 
3.4.3 Decision Tree 
A decision tree classifies a data set through a sequence of decisions, 
where a decision on a current node facilitates a decision to be made on the 
following nodes (Bhargava, 2013). This forms an n-array tree structure, 
where a decision is made by traversing from a root node to a leaf node, 
where the leaf node represents a class. Nodes are formed of attributes or 
features from the data set.  C 4.5 is one of the most common algorithms to 
create a decision tree. Ruggieri (2002) described how C4.5 constructs a tree 
as follow: 
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“The algorithm constructs a decision tree starting from a training set T 
S, which is a set of cases, or tuples in the database terminology. Each case 
specifies value for a collection of attributes and for a class. Each attribute 
may have either discrete or continuous values. Moreover, the special value 
unknown is allowed, to denote unspecified values. The class may have only 
discrete values.”  
J48 (Bhargava, 2013) – is an open source implementation of the C4.5 
algorithm for decision trees, available through Weka (Hall, 2009). J48 offers 
handling of a variety of input data types, for instance nominal, textual and 
numeric, and is high in performance. The algorithm operates as follows: 
• The algorithm operates over set of instances used for training, C. 
• If all instances in C are in class P 
o Then create a node P and end. 
o Else select attribute F and create division node. 
• Partition the instance C into subset of values (V1..n) for attribute F. 
• Apply the algorithm recursively to each of the subsets of instance C. 
3.4.4 Experiment Environment 
For this chapter, 10% of the whole KDD’99 intrusion detection data set 
was used for training; this small subset was selected randomly and represents 
the complete KDD data set. This data set represents a concise version of the 
whole data. This data set contained approximately half a million classified 
instances of network data packets (KDD'99, 1999).  For the purpose of 
testing the effectiveness of thes model created, 34% of this data set, which 
approximates to 168,000 of known classified instances, was used. A training 
model has been created after considering two model creation strategies: 
1. All-Classes: In this case, a training model has been created by 
considering all the classes described in the KDD intrusion detection 
data set. 
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2. Two-Classes: In this case, a training model has been created by 
categorising the KDD data set into only two different classes, namely 
normal and malicious. 
3.4.5 All-Classes Based Model Creation Strategy 
Table 3.1 shows the results of instances, classified correctly and 
incorrectly, upon use of Naïve Bayes and Decision Tree (J48) algorithms, for 
creation of a training model using an all-classes model creation strategy. It is 
noted that results of correctly classified instances, by employing Decision 
Tree, are slightly better than Naïve Bayes (Bhargava, 2013) (Altwaijry, 
2013). 
 
Instances Classified Naïve Bayes Decision Tree 
Correctly 
91.82% (154228) 99.95% (167890) 
Incorrectly 
8.18% (13739) 0.04% (77) 
Table 3.1: Results for Naïve Bayes and Decision Tree Using an 
All-Classes Model Creation Strategy 
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 show the comparison between predicted 
and expected classes using Naïve Bayes and Decision Tree classifiers 
respectively. It is clear from the graphs that in Decision Tree predicted 
classes are the same as the expected classes, which is observed using a 45 
degree gradient. While in the case of the Naïve Bayes approach, a large 
amount of variance is caused by conflict between predicted and expected 
classes. It is further observed that Normal class packets have a large amount 
of jitter that is a result of incorrect prediction, using the Naïve Bayes training 
model. 
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Figure 3.3: Variance of predicted vs. expected classes using the 
Naïve Bayes all-classes model creation strategy 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Variance of predicted vs. expected classes using 
Decision Tree all- classes model creation strategy 
Table 3.2 shows the consolidated comparative results per class for 
each classifier for metrics True-Positive (TP) and False-Positive (FP). It is 
observed that, although Naïve Bayes has a high TP, it is skewed by results of 
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FP. On the other hand, the Decision Tree generates almost a high consistent 
TP and a consistently low FP. 
 
Class 
True-Positive False-Positive 
Naïve Bayes Decision Tree Naïve Bayes 
Decision 
Tree 
Normal 0.617 0.999 0 0 
Buffer 
Overflow 0.462 0.615 0.001 0 
Load Module 0.4 0.2 0.001 0 
Perl 0 0 0 0 
Neptune 0.999 1 0.001 0 
Smurf 0.998 1 0 0 
Guess Passwd 0.952 1 0.025 0 
Pod 0.987 1 0 0 
Teardrop 0.988 0.997 0 0 
Portsweep 0.111 0.979 0.01 0 
IPsweep 0.97 0.993 0.007 0 
Land 0.75 1 0 0 
FTP Write 0 0.5 0.002 0 
Back 0.984 0.996 0 0 
IMAP 1 0.4 0 0 
Satan 0.894 0.986 0.002 0 
PHF 1 0 0.011 0 
NMap 0.457 0.988 0.001 0 
Multihop 0 0 0.006 0 
Warezmaster 0.75 1 0.002 0 
Warezclient 0.107 0.979 0 0 
Spy 0 0 0 0 
Rootkit 0.667 0 0.012 0 
 
Table 3.2: Accuracy / Class for Naïve Bayes And Decision Tree 
Using All-Classes Model Creation Strategy 
The results also show that a high FP rate has been observed in classes 
corresponding to probing, and in remote to local attack categories. This 
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indicates the attacks were mainly in categories where the attacker is scanning 
the machine to understand more about vulnerabilities of network resources, 
and furthermore that these could be initiated from remote locations, where a 
local machine could have been compromised. 
3.4.6 Two-Classes Based Model Creation Strategy 
Table 3.3 shows the results of instances classified correctly and 
incorrectly upon use of the Naïve Bayes and Decision Tree (J48) algorithms 
for creation of a training model using a two-classes model creation strategy. 
It is observed that using training models created by use of Decision Tree is 
better than Naïve Bayes. 
It is further observed that in contrast to the all-classes-based model 
creation strategy, Naïve Bayes has performed better in correctly classifying 
the instances in the two-classes-based model creation strategy, as the results 
are improved from 91.82% to 98.44%. 
Instances Classified Naïve Bayes Decision Tree 
Correctly 98.44% (165349) 99.96% (167898) 
Incorrectly 1.56% (2618) 0.04% (69) 
Table 3.3: Results for Naïve Bayes And Decision Tree Using 
Two-Classes Model Creation Strategy 
 
Figure 3.5: Variance of predicted vs. expected classes using 
Naïve Bayes two-classes model creation strategy 
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Furthermore, it is observed in figure 3.5 that the number of incorrectly 
classified instances has decreased, as shown in the cluster on the top-left and 
bottom-right quadrant of the graph. This can be attributed to a reduction in 
granularity of classes, associated with data making the model for prediction 
of instances more accurate. 
 
Figure 3.6: Variance of predicted vs. expected classes using 
Decision Tree two-classes model creation strategy 
It is observed that Decision Tree has performed consistently, even with a 
change of model creation strategy. There has been a nominal increase in 
correctly classification of instances, and figure 3.6 shows the number of 
incorrectly classified instances decreased, as seen in the top-left and bottom-
right quadrant of the graph. 
Class True-Positive False-Positive 
Naïve Bayes Decision 
Tree 
Naïve 
Bayes 
Decision 
Tree 
Normal 0.989 0.999 0.017 0 
Malicious 0.983 1 0.011 0.001 
Table 3.4: Accuracy / Class for Naïve Bayes and Decision Tree 
two-classes Model Creation Strategy 
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Table 3.4 presents the combined comparative results per class for each 
classifier for metrics TP and FP for the two-classes-based model creation 
strategy. It is observed that Decision Tree has consistently a high true-
positive rate and consequently a low false-positive rate. 
3.4.7 Chosen Model 
Overall, it has been observed in the context of the all-classes and two-
classes-based model creation strategies that the Decision Tree algorithm is 
more effective in prediction of classes for data instances. Furthermore, the 
true-positive rate of the Decision Tree algorithm is higher in the two-classes-
based model creation strategy, making this two-classes-based strategy a 
better choice for the model. However, it should be noted that the objective of 
our model is to provide prediction of data instances with high granularity of 
categorised class, so that categorised instances can be subjected to further 
critique using reasoning mechanisms. Because of the aforementioned 
requirement, we have selected the all-classes-based training model creation 
strategy for prediction of classes for data instances. In other words, the all-
classes-based strategy for creating a model is giving more information in 
context of classes without loss of correctly and incorrectly classified 
instances. 
3.5 Reasoning Module 
3.5.1 Overview 
The proposed reasoning mechanism in this chapter classifies the network 
traffic into normal (1) or attack (0). In the other word, the mechanism is 
based on a hybrid model consists of two modules; the first one is based on 
neural network while the second one is based on fuzzy logic. Figure 3.7 
gives an overview of the proposed hybrid model in this chapter. The hybrid 
model will classify network traffic as normal if both modules classify it as 
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normal while it will classify it as attack if either of the modules classifies the 
traffic as attack. 
Neural network has the advantage of the ability to work with not 
complete and precise data. This merit can be employed in IDS context for 
detecting attacks patterns presented during the training phase but modified 
by an attacker in order to pass through the system (Kukiełka, Kotulski, 
2010). The flexibility of fuzzy logic can be employed in case of uncertain 
problem of intrusion detection and allows much greater complexity for IDS 
(Shanmugam, 2009).  
 
Figure 3.7: Hybrid Model Overview 
The benefit of using the hybrid approach is increasing the intrusion 
detection rate, some of attacks may not be detected by one of the modules 
but the other one may be able to detect them. In other words, one module 
will overcome some of other module shortcomings in detecting malicious 
traffic. However, there is a chance of increasing the false-positive rate for 
malicious traffic. 
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3.5.2 Neural Network 
As described in the previous chapter, artificial neural network is a 
computational model inspired by the principles of an animal's central 
nervous systems. This model has the capabilities of machine learning, as well 
as pattern recognition.  It has been described as a system that adapts its 
structure in the learning phase; this adoption is based on external or internal 
information flowing through the system (Anthony, Bartlett, 2009).  The most 
commonly used architecture of supervised neural networks is Multi-Level 
Perceptron (MLP). That architecture contains a number of layers (one input 
layer, a number of hidden layers, and one output layer), each layer contains a 
number of processing units called neurons. Each neuron is connected with a 
weight to a neuron in the following layer. MLP uses the back propagation 
algorithm in the training process. In that algorithm, the input data is passed to 
the neural network. Then, the output of the network is compared to the 
desired output to compute the error. That error is used to adjust the weights, 
in order to get closer to the desired output. The error calculation and weight 
changes are explained by the following (Anthony, Bartlett, 2009): 
             𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗(𝐸𝐸) = 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗(𝐸𝐸) − 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗(𝐸𝐸)        (5)                                                       𝜀𝜀(𝐸𝐸) = 1
2
∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗
2
𝑗𝑗 (𝐸𝐸)                 (6)                                            ∆𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸) =  −𝜇𝜇 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑛𝑛)𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗(𝑛𝑛) 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸)    (7)                   
Where, 
𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 is the calculated error for neuron j. 
n is the index of training data. 
𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 is the desired value. 
𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 is the produced value by neuron j. 
𝜀𝜀 is the error of entire output. 
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𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝 is the weight of the connection between neuron i in a layer and neuron 
j in the following layer.  
𝜇𝜇is the learning rate (a value between 0.2 and  0.8). 
3.5.3 Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy logic is a computational approach based on human language rules. 
The fuzzy systems translate the defined rules to a mathematical equivalent 
(Rajasekaran,  Pai, 2003). Those systems, as shown in figure 3.8, consist of 
fuzzifier, interference engine, rules base, and defuzzifier. Fuzzy systems 
work as follows (Rajasekaran,  Pai, 2003): 
• The fuzzifier converts the crisp inputs to fuzzy set by using specified 
membership functions for each input. 
•  Based on the defined rules, the interference engine produces a fuzzy 
output. 
• The fuzzy output is converted to a crisp value using the membership 
Functions defined for defuzzification.   
 
Figure 3.8: Fuzzy logic Components 
3.5.4 Experiment Environment 
The architecture used in the neural network module is MLP. This 
architecture has three layers. The first layer contains 10 neurons; the hidden 
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layer contains 8 neurons, with one neuron in the output layers. The neural 
network module was trained using 10% of the whole KDD’99 intrusion 
detection data set. It has been trained by setting the max mean square error to 
.01, and max number of epochs to 3000. All weights are initially randomly 
set. See Appendix B for the neural network training code. The code is based 
on using a neural network PHP library written by Akerboom (2007) 
The training data was pre-processed as follows, before starting the 
training process: 
1. Feature labelling:  Label non-numeric attributes with numeric values. 
Some features are not represented by a numeric value (e.g. service), 
while it is required to deal with a numeric value in the neural 
network. For example, each service has been given a number; 1 for 
telnet, 2 for ftp_data. 
2. Features normalisation:  It has been found that each feature has a 
different range. Thus, all attributes have been normalised in a way 
that has made each attribute have the same range (between 0 and 1). 
This step helps in making the selected attributes comparable.  
3. Remove redundant data:  Removing redundant or repeated data from 
the training data set prevents the training algorithm to be biased in 
the direction of more frequent records, and ignoring less frequent 
records. The number of the training data set after removing the 
duplicates is 142,000. 
The rules of the fuzzy module were created using 10%` of the whole 
KDD’99 intrusion detection data set as follows (See Appendix C for the 
fuzzy rules generation code): 
 
1. All selected features, apart from ‘service’ (as it is a discrete value not 
continuous), have been normalised in a way that has made each attribute 
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have the same range (between 0 and 1). This step helps in simplifying the 
rules generation process. 
2. We selected three values V1, V2, V3, where: 
V1= 0.043, V2= 0.375, V3 =0.75 
3. During the iteration through the training data, each selected feature (apart 
from ‘service’) was translated from a numeric value to a description as 
follows: 
0    ≤ attribute value < V1 → Very Low (VL) 
V1 ≤ attribute value < V2 → Low (L)  
V2 ≤ attribute value < V3 → High (H) 
V3 ≤ attribute value ≤ 1    → Very High (VH) 
The output is described as either normal or attack. The rule was then 
created in the following form: 
If (feature1 is feature1_desc AND feature2 is feature2_desc AND 
….feature10 is feature10_desc) Then output is output_desc 
4. The created rule in the previous step would not be added to the rule base, 
if it was previously added, to avoid having duplicate rules. The total 
number of rules added to the rule base is 1343. Different values had been 
tried for V1, V2, V3, but the value selected above gave the best results in 
terms of false-positive and detection rates. The last step in implementing 
the fuzzy module was the membership functions selection for both inputs 
(selected feature) and output. Figure 3.9 shows the membership functions 
for all inputs, apart from the ‘service’ feature, which was handled by a 
singleton membership function for each value, as it is a discrete attribute.  
The output has two membership functions as shown in figure 3.10. 
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Figure 3.9: Membership function for the selected feature (not including 
the ‘service’ feature) 
 
Figure 3.10: Membership function for the output 
5. The results of evaluation obtained from the hybrid model, after getting 
the neural network training done, and completing the rules generation 
and membership functions selection for the fuzzy module, are shown in 
table 5.  The evaluation process was carried out using 10% of the whole 
KDD’99 intrusion detection data set; this data set is different from the 
data set presented in the neural network training and rules generation 
stage. 
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3.5.5 Experiment Results 
Table 3.5 shows that the hybrid model achieved a higher detection 
rate for malicious traffic than either the neural network or fuzzy logic 
modules, each one individually. On the other hand, the false-positive rate of 
the hybrid model is higher than both the neural network and fuzzy logic, 
each one individually. See Appendix D for the hybrid system code. The 
fuzzy module implementation is based on a PHP library developed by 
Jarzęcki (2011). 
 
Class 
True-Positive False-Positive 
Neural 
Network 
Fuzzy 
Logic 
Hybrid 
Model 
Neural 
Network 
Fuzzy 
Logic 
Hybrid 
Model 
Normal 0.971 0.978 .952 0.029 .022 .048 
Malicious 0.966 .9995 .9997 0.034 0.0005 .0003 
 
Table 3.5: Results of the hybrid model using Neural Network 
and fuzzy Logic 
3.6 Conclusion 
SNORT monitors network traffic and uses content searching and 
matching to detect attacks. One of the problems with using SNORT is the 
fact that it is not adaptable for detecting new attacks. In addition, it generates 
false alarms at a high rate. 
Our experiments can be used to conclude that data mining can be 
implemented as an added portion to a pre-existing IDS. When implemented 
properly, data mining can improve the classification process, resulting in a 
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lowered number of false-positive alerts. The first stage of the proposed 
model built using the Decision Tree approach is able to classify most data 
correctly, has a better accuracy rate, detection rate and lower false-positive 
rate. In this chapter, we have compared two different training model creation 
strategies, using Naïve Bayes and Decision Tree algorithms. It is concluded 
that the all-classes-based training model creation using Decision Tree is the 
most effective, as it not only provides a better true-positive rate, but also a 
high level in granularity for classification of data instances, and this has high 
precedence over a slightly better training model created using the two-classes 
model creation strategy.  
The second stage of the proposed model (reasoning mechanism) was built 
using a hybrid approach. The hybrid approach in this chapter used both 
neural network and fuzzy logic.  The benefit of using the hybrid approach is 
in increasing the intrusion detection rate; some of the attacks may not be 
detected by one of the modules, but the other one may be able to detect them. 
The results obtained by that approach achieved a higher detection rate than 
both the neural network and fuzzy logic, each one individually. However, it 
has a higher false-positive rate. 
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CHAPTER 4 
_________________ 
MULTI STAGE ATTACKS 
4.1 Introduction 
Multi-stage attacks can evolve dramatically these days, causing much 
loss and damage to organisations.  These attacks occur through multiple 
steps, each step looking legal and not violating any rules. Therefore, 
Clark (2010) described multi-stage attacks in his research as the most 
challenging set of attacks to investigate and deter. He also described 
multi-stage attacks as follows: 
 “Multi-stage attacks within a single jurisdiction may permit the 
imposition of rules that facilitate technical solutions to attributions. We 
suggest that such technical solutions form a ripe area for research. But 
solutions to preventing the attacks of most concern, multi-stage multi-
jurisdictional ones, will require not only technical methods, but 
legal/policy solutions as well. Better attribution techniques will neither 
solve nor prevent such exploitations. 
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Redesigning the network to accomplish robust attribution would not 
solve the most serious network-based cyberattacks and cyber 
exploitations being experienced today, which are multi-stage and 
multi-jurisdictional.” 
There is evidence of Clark’s argument, when using the proposed 
solution in the previous chapter. The solution achieved a high level of 
detection rate. However, it has been found that the proposed solution 
works well with single-stage attacks and is not efficient when dealing 
with multi-stage attacks. That solution is signature-based (attributes 
techniques), which is not useful in the case of multi-stage attacks. It has 
also been found that different solutions have been introduced to stop 
attacks and protect organisations. However, some of those solutions 
ignore some communications in the network and find difficulties in 
differentiating between legitimate and illegal traffic, as they do not 
violate any rules.  
Those attacks occur through multiple phases to get access to an 
organisation. Most of those attacks involve three phases. In the first 
phase, attackers try to analyse available information about the target, to 
find vulnerabilities and weaknesses that can be exploited. In the second 
phase, attackers exploit the weaknesses found in the first phase to inject 
malware into, or to gain access to the system. In addition, they try to get 
more details and conduct a deep analysis about the system to find data or 
resources in which they have an interest. In the final phase after gaining 
access, attackers destroy the system or steal valuable information 
(GCHQ and Cert-UK, 2015).  
This chapter goes through four different multi-stage attack scenarios. 
The aim of this chapter is to understand the behaviour of multi-stage 
attacks and try to find a clue to predicting or detecting such kinds of 
attacks. In each scenario, the network traffic will be analysed 
highlighting all steps that have occurred and not been considered by 
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many security systems. The first scenario is about communication with a 
bad DNS server and how that has been employed by an attacker to 
register machines to its bot army. The second scenario discusses the 
Shady Rat attack, which is a good example showing how social 
engineering can be employed to target an organisation. The third 
scenario shows how header splitting can be employed by an attacker to 
target a network connected to a web host running a web application. The 
last scenario discussed how a vulnerable FTP service could be exploited 
to perform multi-stage attacks. The outcome from analysing each 
scenario will be in the form of rules that will be used in building a 
solution that will predict multi-stage attacks before they have an impact 
and damage organisations. 
4.2 Analysis Approach 
 The following information will be looked at for each scenario: 
IPs and URLs involved in conversations. 
Operating Systems 
Summary of conversations. 
 Based on the information extracted from the trace files and 
summary of conversations of traffic, the behaviour of the attacker will be 
modelled and some rules can be extracted to predict similar scenarios. 
Those rules will be used later in a proposed framework to detect such 
attacks.  
4.3 Scenario A 
4.3.1 Trace file 
The communication that occurred during this scenario has been 
captured in a pcap file (TP Group, 2015).  This file will be analysed using 
Wireshark to get all the information required for analysing this scenario.  
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4.3.2 IP Involved in the Scenario 
By looking at tables 4.1 and 4.2 which contain the IP participating in 
the communication, it has been found that there are 268 packets and 
10.129.211.13 participated in this scenario with a rate of 52.99% as a source 
IP address, while it participated with a rate of 47.01% as a destination IP 
address.  In other words, 10.129.211.13 participated in all conversations 
during this scenario. It has been found that there are some signs that the 
identified IP address was compromised during this attack. One of those 
signs is receiving the same ICMP message in a relatively short time from 
different IP addresses, which indicates that there was some sort of scan 
occurring through it. 
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Table 4.1: IP addresses participated in the first scenario as sourc 
Source IP Addresses Count Percent 
10.129.211.13 142 52.99% 
216.234.235.165 6 2.24% 
61.189.243.240 5 1.87% 
10.129.102.9 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.8 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.7 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.6 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.5 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.4 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.3 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.22 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.21 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.20 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.2 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.19 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.18 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.17 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.16 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.15 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.14 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.13 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.12 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.11 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.10 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.1 4 1.49% 
10.129.102.0 4 1.49% 
10.129.56.6 3 1.12% 
205.188.226.248 2 0.75% 
10.129.102.31 2 0.75% 
10.129.102.30 2 0.75% 
10.129.102.29 2 0.75% 
10.129.102.28 2 0.75% 
10.129.102.27 2 0.75% 
10.129.102.26 2 0.75% 
10.129.102.25 2 0.75% 
10.129.102.24 2 0.75% 
10.129.102.23 2 0.75% 
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Destination IP 
Addresses Count Percentage  
   10.129.211.13 126 47.01%   10.129.102.31 2 0.75% 
61.189.243.240 7 2.61%   10.129.102.30 2 0.75% 
216.234.235.165 3 1.12%   10.129.102.3 2 0.75% 
10.129.56.6 3 1.12%   10.129.102.29 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.9 2 0.75%   10.129.102.28 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.8 2 0.75%   10.129.102.27 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.7 2 0.75%   10.129.102.26 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.6 2 0.75%   10.129.102.25 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.5 2 0.75%   10.129.102.24 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.4 2 0.75%   10.129.102.23 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.31 2 0.75%   10.129.102.22 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.30 2 0.75%   10.129.102.21 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.3 2 0.75%   10.129.102.20 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.29 2 0.75%   10.129.102.2 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.28 2 0.75%   10.129.102.19 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.27 2 0.75%   10.129.102.18 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.26 2 0.75%   10.129.102.17 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.25 2 0.75%   10.129.102.16 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.24 2 0.75%   10.129.102.15 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.23 2 0.75%   10.129.102.14 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.22 2 0.75%   10.129.102.13 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.21 2 0.75%   10.129.102.12 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.20 2 0.75%   10.129.102.11 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.2 2 0.75%   10.129.102.10 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.19 2 0.75%   10.129.102.1 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.18 2 0.75%   10.129.102.0 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.17 2 0.75%   205.188.226.248 1 0.37% 
10.25.102.16 2 0.75%  10.25.102.0 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.15 2 0.75%  10.129.102.9 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.14 2 0.75%  10.129.102.8 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.13 2 0.75%  10.129.102.7 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.12 2 0.75%  10.129.102.6 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.11 2 0.75%  10.129.102.5 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.10 2 0.75%  10.129.102.4 2 0.75% 
10.25.102.1 2 0.75%  
   
Table 4.2: IP addresses participated in the first scenario as destinations 
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4.3.3 Stages of the attack   
It has been found in the trace file that the first packet indicates that 
the IP identified earlier (10.129.211.13) carried out a DNS query to a 
domain name (bbjj.househot.com) as shown in Table 4.3. This operation 
looks absolutely normal and does not give any indication of a problem. 
Although the communication seems legitimate, it has been found with 
deeper analysis that the DNS server that was queried is one on the DNS 
blacklist. 
No. Time Source Destination Protocol length Info 
1 0 10.129.211.13 10.129.56.6 DNS 77 
Standard query 
0x0006  A 
bbjj.househot.co
m 
Table 4.3:  DNS Query 
10.129.211.13 then received a reply (DNS response). The DNS 
response received gives another indication of irregular behaviour as it 
contains eleven IP addresses as shown in Table 4.4 while a normal DNS 
response contains 5 IP addresses. 
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info 
2 0.237997 10.129.56.6 10.129.211.13 DNS 399 
Standard query 
response 0x0006  
CNAME 
ypgw.wallloan.com 
A 216.234.235.165 
A 151.198.6.55 A 
216.234.247.191 A 
68.112.229.228 A 
61.189.243.240 A 
218.12.94.58 A 
61.145.119.63 A 
202.98.223.87 A 
218.249.83.118 A 
68.186.110.158 A 
221.208.154.214 
Table 4.4: DNS Response 
The compromised host then tries to establish a connection with 
some of the IP addresses returned in the DNS response. Those IPs 
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responded by ICMP messages, as shown in table 4.5, to say that the 
destination is unreachable. 
No. Time Source Destination Protocol length info 
3 0.239858 10.129.211.13 216.234.235.165 TCP 62 
1047->18067 
[SYN] Seq=0 
Win=64240 
Len=0 
MSS=1460 
SACK_PERM=1 
4 0.240407 216.234.235.165 10.129.211.13 ICMP 70 
Destination 
unreachable 
(Port 
unreachable) 
Table 4.5: Failure to Establish a Connection 
It has been found that the compromised host sent another DNS 
query targeting the canonical name (ypgw.wallloan.com) found in the 
DNS response on the second packet. A DNS response is then returned 
containing eleven IP addresses. The compromised host tried then to 
establish a connection with one of the IP addresses returned and it 
succeeded to establish a connection with 61.189.243.240 as shown in 
table 4.6. 
No. Time Source Destination Protocol length info 
11 337.7635 10.129.211.13 61.189.243.240 TCP 62 
1048->18067 
[SYN] Seq=0 
Win=64240 
Len=0 
MSS=1460 
SACK_PERM=1 
12 338.1601 61.189.243.240 10.129.211.13 TCP 62 
18067->1048 
[SYN, ACK] 
Seq=0 Ack=1 
Win=65535 
Len=0 
MSS=1460 
SACK_PERM=1 
13 338.1603 10.129.211.13 61.189.243.240 TCP 54 
1048->18067 
[ACK] Seq=1 
Ack=1 
Win=64240 
Len=0 
Table 4.6: Failure to Establish a Connection 
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The compromised host then started to send packets to the targeted 
host as shown in Table 4.7. By looking at the contents of the 
conversations between the compromised and targeted hosts, it turned 
out that it contains commands used by botnet as shown in table 4.8. 
 
No. Time Source Destination Protocol length info 
14 338.1604 10.129.211.13 61.189.243.240 TCP 67 
1048->18067 
[PSH, ACK] 
Seq=1 Ack=1 
Win=64240 
Len=13 
15 338.7196 61.189.243.240 10.129.211.13 TCP 60 
18067->1048 
[ACK] Seq=1 
Ack=14 
Win=65522 
Len=0 
16 338.7196 10.129.211.13 61.189.243.240 TCP 71 
1048->18067 
[PSH, ACK] 
Seq=14 Ack=1 
Win=64240 
Len=17 
17 339.1223 61.189.243.240 10.129.211.13 TCP 77 
18067->1048 
[PSH, ACK] 
Seq=1 Ack=31 
Win=65505 
Len=23 
18 339.1224 10.129.211.13 61.189.243.240 TCP 75 
1048->18067 
[PSH, ACK] 
Seq=31 Ack=24 
Win=64217 
Len=21 
19 339.6067 61.189.243.240 10.129.211.13 TCP 110 
18067->1048 
[PSH, ACK] 
Seq=24 Ack=52 
Win=65484 
Len=56 
20 339.6068 10.129.211.13 61.189.243.240 TCP 72 
1048->18067 
[PSH, ACK] 
Seq=52 Ack=80 
Win=64161 
Len=18 
21 340.0053 61.189.243.240 10.129.211.13 TCP 257 
18067->1048 
[PSH, ACK] 
Seq=80 Ack=70 
Win=65466 
Len=203 
Table 4.7: Communication between the compromised and 
targeted host 
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Packet 
No. 
Command 
14 USeR l l l l 
15 
 
16 NiCK p8-00196671 
17 :a7 001 p8-00196671 : 
18 USeRHOST p8-00196671 
19 :a7 302 p8-00196671 :p8-00196671=+l@010.129.211.13 
20 JOiN #p8 ihodc9hi 
21 
:a7 332 p8-00196671 #p8 :!Q 
gfcagihehehadkcpcpgigpgngfhegphhgocogbgpgmcogdgpgncphihihigmgpgm
hh hegggjgigbhihihihicphdgpgdglhddjgbcogkhagh :a7 333 p8-00196671 #p8 
a 1134159047 :a7 366 p8-00196671 #p8 : 
Table 4.8: Bot net commands used between the compromised 
and targeted hosts 
4.3.4 Summary of the Scenario 
This scenario gives an example of how attackers can register 
machines to its bot army.  Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the sequence of 
the attack. The figure shows that the attacker used the compromised host to 
contact a bad DNS server. The DNS server returned an unusual DNS 
response containing 11 IP addresses, while a normal response normally does 
not return more than five IP addresses. The attacker used the compromised 
host to scan IP addresses returned in the DNS query response and tried to 
establish communication with them. After a successful 3-handshake with 
one of the IP addresses returned in the response, the attacker sent packets 
that contain commands used by the botnet. 
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4.3.5 Analysis Outcome: 
Some steps in this scenario could be considered to predict the 
occurrence of the attack. Detecting a DNS query with a bad DNS server can 
trigger an alert of malicious traffic. In addition, an irregular DNS response 
can indicate unusual behaviour. Moreover, sending packets containing 
commands used by botnet gives a strong indication that the traffic is 
malicious.  
 
 
Figure 4.1:  Stages of scenario A 
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4.4 Scenario B 
4.4.1 Social Engineering 
This scenario shows how social engineering can play a role in 
constructing a multi-stage attack. Social Engineering is defined by Chitrey 
(2012) in his comprehensive study of social engineering-based attacks as 
follow: 
“Social Engineering is the art of exploiting the weakest link of 
information security systems: the people who are using them. Social 
Engineering is a method of gathering information and performing attacks 
against Information and Information Systems.” 
In other words, it is the art of abusing human behaviour in order to 
violate security without victims realising that they have been manipulated 
(SANS, 2007). Another comment added by Mitnick in an interview with the 
BBC News Online (2002) shows the role of social engineering in 
constructing attacks: 
“What I found personally to be true was that it's easier to 
manipulate people rather than technology. Most of the time organisations 
overlook that human element.” 
4.4.2 Operation Shady Rat Attack 
One of the multi-stage attacks that is social engineering-based is 
Operation Shady Rat. This attack was categorized by MacAfee (2011) as an 
advanced persistent threat. In addition, they describe it as one of the largest 
series of cyber-attacks ever. This attack started in 2006 and was reported in 
2011 as hitting more than 72 large organisations, including twenty two 
government organisations, thirteen defence contractors, ten technology and 
electronic firms, eight policy influencers, and five 2008 Olympics related 
organisations (Talglobal, 2011). The next section will show how this attack 
can target an organisation. 
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An Operation Shady Rat attack involves five steps. In the first step, 
attackers select one or more organisations, then email individuals who work 
at those organisations. The emails sent contain information that attracts 
those individuals. Those emails also contain attached files that are relevant 
to the email body. Those files appear to recipients as normal files such as 
Word, Excel, or pdf files, but they are loaded with malicious code. For 
example, employees in a marketing company have a high interest in getting 
new contacts. Therefore, attackers may target this group by sending an 
email attached with an Excel file containing a contacts list. 
In the second stage, recipients download the attached files, then open 
them. At the point of opening the file, the malware is installed on the 
victim’s computer, thus compromising their computer. 
 In the third stage, the installed malicious program tries to establish a 
connection with a remote site specified in the code. The remote site URL 
does not look suspicious and it looks like a link to an image or normal html 
file, but the returned contents from that URL contains some information 
used by the malicious code. That information cannot be seen as being 
suspicious content, as it appears as a part of the html content. In addition, 
that information may be encoded or encrypted, so it will be difficult to 
analyse. For example, html comments can be used to embed the information 
that malware uses inside the html content. The comments are visible to end 
users, look absolutely legitimate, and cannot be seen as any kind of threat.  
The html comments may contain an IP address of a remote server or a 
command encoded in an encrypted or encoded format as shown in figure 
4.2. 
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Figure 4.2:  Example of HTML comments used embedded in HTML to 
be used by Malware 
In the fourth stage, the installed malicious code establishes a connection 
with the IP address obtained in the third stage. In the fifth stage, attackers at 
the remote site establish a remote shell and run shell commands targeting 
the compromised machine. Attackers at this point can upload or download 
from the compromised side. Figure 4.3 shows the sequence of this scenario. 
<!-- {5e1468jhsaa3q} --> 
<!-- {8wfd2f7il2xfh} --> 
<!-- {yaqwehd761mnb} --> 
<!-- {yaqwehd761mnb} --> 
<!-- {UGw^ddd,wddaa} --> 
<!-- {z2x^4r2,aqwrd} --> 
<!-- {saw^dwa,1jssa} --> 
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Figure 4.3: Stages of scenario B 
4.4.3 Analysis Outcome 
All steps of this scenario look legitimate and not suspicious. The only 
thing that can be checked, that may give an indication about suspicious 
traffic between the malicious code and other servers, are the reputations of 
the servers. There are some web services available and updated on a daily 
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basis, that provide reputation and more information about servers involved 
by passing URLs or IP addresses.  Based on an evaluation obtained from 
those web services, the system can raise an alert of potential attacks. 
4.5 Scenario C 
4.5.1 CRLF Injection  
The CRLF (Carriage Return and Line Feed) injection, which is also 
known as HTTP Response splitting, is an attack that can be easily 
constructed. However, it is an extremely destructive web attack.  Attackers 
construct this kind of attack by exploiting vulnerable web applications that 
may allow also other types of vulnerabilities, such as cross site scripting and 
cross site forgery. The CRLF injection is carried out by injecting a very 
significant sequence of characters into web requests. This sequence contains 
two special characters representing EOL (End of line), which is used as a 
marker for many protocols, including such as HTTP and NNTP.  In web 
applications, headers are split-based on the position of CRLF in requests. 
Malicious users inject their own CRLF sequence into an HTTP request. In 
the absence of filtering malicious inputs, malicious users will be able to 
control the functionalities of a web application function. In the next section, 
two examples of CRLF injection will be discussed showing how CRLF 
injections can be employed by attackers to construct multi-stage attacks 
(Hall, 2011). 
4.5.2 Scenario C.1 
This scenario is based on exploiting an insecure web application. 
This insecure web application can give a chance for attackers to get access 
to machines. The scenario shows how attackers exploit a vulnerable PHP 
web application to make a CRLF injection. The first step in this attack is 
carrying out a web vulnerability scan on a web server. This scan gives an 
attacker information about PHP configurations and different URLs, 
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including POST and GET parameters sent with them. The attacker then uses 
that information to send an email to a victim containing a CRLF-
manipulated link. This link looks legitimate, but it contains parameters set to 
values that makes a vulnerable web application open a different URL rather 
than the specified URL in the code, as shown below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: CRLF Injection on a PHP script 
The injected URL may point to a file that runs on the victim’s 
machine to push a remote shell for the attacker.  The attacker proceeds by 
getting access to the web server, then downloads files or scans the network 
to find information they are interested in, or find targets they want to 
destroy.  Figure 4.5 shows the different steps that occur during this attack. 
 
 
 
Consider the PHP script below is saved as getfile.php: 
<?php 
$folder = $_GET[‘folder’]; 
$file = $_GET[‘file’]; 
passthru("http://www.sitea.com/api?folder=$folder&file=$file"); 
?> 
 
If an attacker tries to send send an email containing a link similar to: 
getfile.php?folder=visby&file=gotland%20HTTP/1.0%0D%0AHost%3A%20www. 
siteb.com%0D%0AUser-Agent%3A%20Ulf/0.0%0D%0AReferer%3A%20http%3A%2F 
%2Fwww.gnuheter.org%2F%0D%0ACookie%3A%20user%3Dulf%0D%0A%0D%0A 
(should be on one line) 
This HTTP query will be sent to www.site1.st: 
GET /api?folder=visby&file=gotland HTTP/1.0 
Host: www.siteb.com 
User-Agent: Ulf/0.0 
Referer: http://www.gnuheter.org/ 
Cookie: user=ulf 
 
HTTP/1.0 
Host: www.sitea.com 
User-Agent: PHP/4.1.2 
 
As you can see, the real headers from PHP are sent as well, but the web server ignores 
them, as we send two CRLFs before them to indicate that the headers are over. 
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Figure 4.5: Stages of scenario C.1 
4.5.3 Scenario C.2 
This scenario is similar to the above; the difference in this scenario 
is that attackers injects html contents that will be displayed to the victim as 
follows: 
   94 
http://www.site1.com/login.php?param1=%0d%0aContent-Type: 
text/html%0d%0aHTTP/1.1200OK%0d%0aContent-Type: 
text/html%0d%0a%0d%0a%3Chtml%3ELoginContent%3C/html%3E  
When a victim receives an email that contains a manipulated link 
similar to the one above, a login page will be displayed similar to the one 
displayed on the original website. The victim may at this point enter their 
login details that will be sent later to attackers, rather than the host server. 
Attackers then use the login details to steal valuable information. 
4.5.4 Analysis Outcome 
This type of attack can be predicted or stopped at different points. 
The first point is checking parameters sent with web requests coming to the 
web server, whether it can cause CRLF injections or not. In addition to that, 
outgoing requests from the web server can be checked to see whether they 
go to trusted destinations or not.   
4.6 Scenario D 
4.6.1 Vulnerable FTP Service 
File transfer protocol (FTP) is widely and commonly used by many 
organisations, to transfer files over the internet, due to its simplicity. 
However, there are some design decisions in that protocol that can be 
exploited by a malicious user (Lindfors, Peuhkuri, 1999). The next section 
gives an example of how an attacker can obtain unauthorised access through 
a vulnerable FTP service. 
4.6.2 Scenario Description 
This scenario shows how a malicious user attempts to obtain 
unauthorised access on an account on a local machine, which is part of a 
corporate network holding a server connected to the internet. That server 
runs a web service and a vulnerable FTP service. The first step the attacker 
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carries out is performing a port scan on externally visible IP addresses, 
using an Nmap security scanning tool. The aim of that scan is finding an 
open port in the targeted network. Figure 4.6 shows how the Nmap tool is 
used to find an open port. 
 
Figure 4.6: Using Nmap tool to find an open port (Pentration Testing 
Lab, 2012) 
The attacker then tries to find a valid user name and password 
through a tool, such as THC Hydara or metasploit. Figure 4.7 shows how 
metasploit can be used to find a valid username and password for the 
vulnerable FTP service.  
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Figure 4.7: Using the metasploit tool to find a valid ftp login (Pentration 
Testing Lab, 2012) 
The attacker gets access to the FTP server, using the login obtained 
in the previous step, then downloads or deletes files in that server. That 
scenario occurred in a large Dutch hospital, the Groene Hart Ziekenhuis, as 
reported by Spadaro (2013). It was found that the medical records of at least 
50 patients were illegally accessed. Figure 4.8 shows the steps that attack 
goes through. 
   97 
 
Figure 4.8: Stages of scenario D 
4.6.3 Analysis Outcome 
This attack can be predicted or stopped at the scanning point; a block 
scan from unauthorised IP addresses is needed. It can also be stopped when 
detecting upload/download from IP addresses with a low reputation. 
4.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it has been found that predicting or detecting multi-stage 
attacks is difficult to achieve through signature based solutions. Four 
different multi-stage attack scenarios have been analysed to understand the 
behaviour of multi-stage attacks. In the first scenario, a DNS query to a 
black-listed domain name gave a strong indication about malicious 
behaviour. The second scenario shows the sequence of Shady Rat 
Operation.  The third scenario shows how attackers can exploit vulnerable 
web applications to construct an attack based on CRLF injections that is 
also known as header splitting. The last scenario shows how an attacker 
exploited a vulnerable FTP service to attack the network connected to that 
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service. It has been found that each stage in those scenarios looks like 
normal traffic, and does not violate any rule. It has also found that 
predicting those attacks may be achieved by carrying out a reputation check 
of IP addresses found in incoming and outgoing traffic.  The next chapter 
will discuss the proposed solution to predict multi-stage attacks based on an 
IP reputation check.    
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CHAPTER 5 
_________________ 
MULTI STAGE ATTACKS PREDICTION 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, different multi-stage attack scenarios were 
discussed and analysed. It was found that each step in those scenarios 
tended to look innocent and was therefore difficult to capture as illegal 
traffic. Different solutions have been introduced to detect multi-stage 
attacks, some of those being event correlation-based. Event correlation- 
based solutions try to match network events with certain attack patterns. 
When a stream of network events matches a certain pattern, attacks can be 
stopped before progressing to the next stages. Many researchers claim the 
effectiveness of that approach in detecting multi- stage attacks. In a study by 
Spadaro (2013), an investigation was conducted to find out the relation 
between incidents and events that were monitored within today’s IT 
infrastructures of large organisations. Another study was by Chen et al. 
(2006), who built a module called active event correlation on top of the bro 
network intrusion detection systems (NIDS).  
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Although being effective, this approach requires having up-to-date 
multi-stage attack patterns, which is not easy to achieve in a very short time, 
as discovering new complex attacks normally takes some time. The Shady 
Rat Operation attack is a good example of that; it started in 2006 but was 
only discovered in 2011.Thus, it has been decided to follow a different 
approach in this research, rather than network events correlation when 
proposing a solution for predicting multi-stage attacks. The following 
approach is based on evaluating the reputation of IP addresses participating 
in network traffic. Based on the evaluation, it can be decided whether we 
need to stop the traffic with evaluated IP addresses to block potential 
attacks.  This chapter goes through the proposed solution that follows the 
latter approach; it consists of five sections. The first one gives an overview 
of the proposed solution, showing the different modules and flow of data. 
The second section discusses the first component in the solution, which is 
the network sniffer. The third section explains how the second component 
works to get information about IP addresses. The fourth section goes 
through the last module that is fuzzy logic-based. The fifth section shows 
how message brokers can be used to improve the performance of the 
proposed solution. The last section concludes this chapter. 
5.2 An overview of the proposed solution 
As mentioned in the previous section, the proposed solution is based on 
evaluating the reputation of IP addresses participating in the captured 
network traffic. The solution consists mainly of three modules as shown in 
figure 5.1. The first module (Network Sniffer) is responsible for monitoring 
network traffic by reading incoming and outgoing traffic. This module 
extracts IP addresses found in network packets; it reads then passes them to 
the next module (IP info finder). The IP info finder is responsible for 
finding information related to the IP addresses. The information obtained by 
the second module includes IP geographic information and other 
information that shows whether the IP addresses to be checked are 
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malicious. The last module in the proposed solution is fuzzy logic-based; 
fuzzy logic has been chosen rather than other data mining techniques, due to 
its effectiveness in dealing with uncertainty problems. It receives 
information obtained by the IP info finder to be processed through it. The 
output of this module will be in the form of a probability of having 
malicious network traffic. Based on the produced output from the fuzzy 
logic module, action will be taken. The action can be in the form of an email 
to administrators, or updating the firewall rules, to blocking communication 
with the discovered malicious IP addresses. 
 
Figure 5.1: An overview of the proposed solution to detect multi-
stage attacks 
5.3 Network Sniffing Module 
5.3.1 Choosing a sniffing tool 
The network sniffing module is responsible for monitoring the network 
traffic. In other words, it captures incoming and outgoing network traffic. 
There are many available sniffing tools that can do this job, and these tools 
can be either hardware or software. Three parameters have been considered 
when choosing a sniffing tool for the solution proposed in this study. The 
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first one is the portability; it is necessary to use a sniffing tool that works 
with different operating systems (e.g. windows, UNIX). The second 
parameter to be considered   is the simplicity to integrate into the solution; it 
will be difficult to integrate a sniffing tool into the solution, if it is a 
command line or provides APIs. The third parameter is the simplicity in 
obtaining information from the captured data. 
Considering those parameters when looking at snoop, it was found that it 
bundled on the Solaris operating system. However, there is a Linux and 
Windows versions of this tool. Snoop is also a command line interface. The 
main disadvantage of this tool is that it lacks the capability to reassemble IP 
fragments, as reported by So-In (2006). In addition, this tool produces the 
output in a text format and does not provide a graphical interface, that can 
help in conducting further network traffic analysis.  
Another tool looked at is Microsoft Network Monitor; it is bundled with 
Microsoft Windows and it runs only on Windows NT Server 4.0, 
Windows 2000 Server, or Windows Server 2003 and does not have a 
distribution on any other operating system. It has a simple and friendly 
graphical interface and cannot be used through a command line interface. 
However, all functionalities provided through the graphical interface can be 
used through Network Monitor API. 
The last tool looked at is TCPDUMP; it is mainly bundled with Linux 
but available for many operating systems such as Solaris and Mac Os X. It 
is also available for Windows as Windump. This tool is a command line tool 
and does not have a graphical interface. However, there is other software 
developed to present the output of this tool in a graphical format, such as 
wireshark. 
Looking at table 5.1, that gives a comparative overview for the tools 
mentioned above, and based on the three parameters mentioned earlier, it 
was found that the TCPDUMP is the most suitable tool for monitoring 
network traffic in the proposed solution. 
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TCPDUMP will be used to read network traffic packet by packet, 
then extract IP addresses from the captured infomation. This can be 
achieved by using the following TCPDUMP command: 
TCPDUMP -i <Network interface index> -c 1 –n 
Three options have been used with the command; the first one (-i 
<Network interface index>) to specify the index of the network interface 
that will be monitored. The second one (-c 1) to specify the number of 
packets to be captured, in this case we specified this as one. The last option 
(-n) is used to show IP addresses of source and destination. The command 
can be modified to run in different operating systems, such as Windows, by 
modifying the call to the sniffing tool as follows: 
pathtowindumpfolder/windump -i 2 -c 1 –n 
 
Tool Portability 
Simplicity to 
integrate 
Simplicity to obtain info 
Snoop 
 
Has distributions over 
many operating 
systems 
 A command line 
interface so it is 
easy to integrate 
Does not have a graphical 
representation. 
Microsoft 
Network 
Monitor 
Runs only on 
Windows 
 
Provides an API to 
simplify the 
integration 
Has a simple graphical 
interface 
TCPDUMP 
Has distributions over 
many operating 
systems 
 
A command line 
interface so it is 
easy to integrate 
Can be used with software 
such as wireshark to obtain a 
graphical representation 
Table 5.1:  A comparative overview over different sniffing tools 
 Figure 5.2 shows what the output of the command looks like. The 
output shows that the source IP address is 192.168.0.2, while the destination 
IP address is  216.58.210.5. 
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Figure 5.2: The output of the TCPDUMP command 
The network sniffing module has been implemented, using a php 
script. The php script consists of an infinity loop. In each loop, the 
TCPDUMP command described above is executed then its output is parsed 
to extract IP addresses. The IP address is then passed to the next module (IP 
info finder). Figure 5.3 shows the implementation of the network sniffing 
module in PHP. 
 
Figure 5.3: The flow chart of the network sniffing module 
TCPDUMP: listening on \Device\NPF_{F99E0F0C-CD4F-4139-AEAB-1A6B340FBE25} 
20:30:26.810488 IP 192.168.0.2.62350 > 216.58.210.5.443: UDP, length 24 
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5.4 IP Information Finder Module 
5.4.1 IP geographic Location 
This module is responsible for finding information about IP 
addresses passed by the first module. The information gathered about those 
IP addresses will give a strong indication whether they can be source of 
malicious traffic or not. One element of the information being gathered is 
the IP geographic location. It was reported by Musthaler (2014) that 84% of 
malicious traffic in a recent quarter originated from ten countries.  She also 
added that the attacker does not need to be in the country where the traffic 
has originated. In other words, they run their packets through compromised 
machines in those countries. Attackers direct traffic through open proxies in 
order to increase their threats. The traffic will appear as coming from many 
sources. That will give attackers the opportunity to overcome the problem of 
blocked traffic from a certain country, by directing traffic through a 
different country. It may be thought that the solution is to block traffic from 
countries with a high percentage of malicious traffic but this is not practical, 
as there may be legal traffic from these countries. Therefore, it has been 
decided not to consider all traffic coming from a black-listed country as 
malicious. However, geographic location will be considered as one of the 
parameters when evaluating IP addresses in the next module.  
The proposed solution needs to know the countries black-listed by 
administrators, in order to identify whether the IP geographic location is 
suspicious or not. Thus, a simple user interface was developed (see Figure 
5.4) to enable administrators to specify those countries; this list will be 
stored in a database. 
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Figure 5.4: Black-Listed Countries Selection 
The IP geographic location can be obtained by storing IP geographic 
information in a database, then checking the IP address against it to find its 
location. Another way to achieve this information is through one of the 
available web services (API). The main disadvantage of this first solution is 
the need to regularly update. On the other hand, there are many web services 
regularly updated and, therefore, it was decided to go with the second 
option. Neutrinoapi is one of those web services that provides a method (IP-
info) for getting the IP geographic location. Table 5.2 shows the API request 
structure, while table 5.3 shows the API response.  
 
Parameter Required Type Default Description 
Ip Yes String   IPv4 address 
reverse-lookup No Boolean FALSE 
Do reverse DNS (PTR) 
lookup. This option can add 
extra delay to the request so 
only use it if you need it 
Table 5.2: API Request for Finding IP geographic location 
(Neutrino API, 2013) 
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Parameter Type Description 
Valid Boolean Is this a valid IP address 
Country String Full country name 
country-code String ISO 2-letter country code 
City String Full city name (if detectable) 
Region String Full region name (if detectable) 
Longitude Float Location longitude 
Latitude Float Location latitude 
Hostname String IP hostname (if reverse-lookup has been used) 
Table 5.3:  API Response for Finding IP geographic location   (Neutrino 
API, 2013) 
5.4.2 IP Block List 
As mentioned earlier, IP geographic location is not the only criterion 
that can be used to judge whether IP addresses may be a source of malicious 
traffic.  Thus, it is required to check other criteria in conjunction with the IP 
geographic location. One of those criteria is whether the IP address is on a 
block list or not. IP addresses that are on a block list can be spyware, 
hijacked, spam-bot, exploit-bot, bot, or flagged in Dshield. If one of those 
criteria is met, a flag of possible suspicious activity needs to be raised.  
It will also be beneficial to check other criteria such as being an 
anonymous web proxy, or exit tor node; meeting only one of those criteria 
will not necessarily sound the alarm for potential suspicious activity. 
Neutrinoapi web services provide another method (IP-block list) to get 
information about those criteria for a specific IP address. Table 5.4 and 5.5 
shows the API request and response structure for this method. 
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Table 5.4: API Request to check whether IP is block listed (Neutrino 
API, 2013) 
Parameter Type Description 
is-listed boolean Is this IP on a blocklist 
list-count integer The number of blocklists the IP is listed on 
is-proxy boolean IP has been detected as an anonymous web proxy 
is-tor boolean IP is coming from a TOR exit node 
is-vpn boolean IP has been detected as coming from a VPN hosting provider 
is-spyware boolean IP is being used for spyware, malware, botnets or other malicious activities 
is-dshield boolean IP has been flagged on DShield (dshield.org) 
is-hijacked Boolean IP is listed as being stolen or hijacked from the rightful address owner 
is-spider boolean IP is a web spider or crawler (legitimate or otherwise) 
is-bot boolean IP is hosting a malicious bot or is part of a botnet 
is-spam-bot boolean IP address is hosting a spam bot, comment spamming or other spamming software 
is-exploit-bot boolean IP is hosting an exploit finding bot or exploit scanning software 
Table 5.5: API Response check whether IP is block listed   
(Neutrino API, 2013) 
Parameter Required Type Default Description 
Ip Yes string   An IPv4 address 
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5.4.3 IP Rating 
In addition to checking whether the IP is on a block list or not, 
Neutrinoapi web services provides another method (host-reputation) that 
checks the IP rating in Domain Name System Block Lists (DNSBL). In 
other words, this method checks the host’s reputation. Table 5.6 and 5.7 
shows the API request and response structure for this method. 
 
Parameter Required Type Default Description 
Host Yes string 
  An IPv4 address or a domain 
name. 
If you supply a domain name it 
will be checked against the URI 
DNSBL list 
Table 5.6: API Request for Finding IP rating (Neutrino API, 2013) 
   
Parameter Type Description 
is-listed Boolean Is this host blacklisted 
list-count Integer The number of DNSBL's the host is listed on 
Lists Array 
An array of objects for each DNSBL 
checked, with the following keys: 
 
is-listed - true if listed, false if not 
list-name - the name of the DNSBL 
list-host - the domain/hostname of the 
DNSBL 
list-rating - the list rating [1-3] with 1 
being the best rating and 3 the lowest 
rating 
txt-record - the TXT record returned for 
this listing (if listed) 
Table 5.7: API Response for Finding IP rating (Neutrino API, 2013) 
5.4.4 Implementation 
This module has been implemented using a PHP script; the script 
curl library to make the required API calls (See Appendix F). The 
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information obtained from the API calls will then be passed onto the next 
module. Figure 5.5 shows the flow chart of this module. 
 
Figure 5.5: The flow chart of the IP info finder module  
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5.5 The reasoning module 
5.5.1 Data Mining Technique Selection 
The reasoning module is responsible for deciding whether there is 
possible malicious traffic from an IP address, based on data collected from 
the previous module. Analysing the collected data to give a decision can be 
achieved through one of the data mining techniques. It was decided to use 
the fuzzy logic in this module based on many reasons. The first one is that 
analysing the collected data can be simply modelled using the “if  then" 
rules  form, which is supported by fuzzy logic. In addition to this, there are 
some scenarios where there is no certainty for deciding whether an IP 
address is malicious or not. The fuzzy logic is suitable for those ambiguous 
scenarios (Albertos et al. 2008). Moreover, constructing the fuzzy rules for 
this system will not take much effort and time compared to machine 
learning algorithms. Machine learning algorithms require large data sets for 
training to obtain accurate results. In addition, the training time with a large 
data set is very time consuming. Another parameter to be considered in the 
choice of fuzzy logic is its simplicity to adapt to changes occurring in the 
reasoning model, as it requires only modification of the fuzzy rules. On the 
other hand, machine learning algorithm models need to be trained in that 
case. Pulo (1999), in his investigation about fuzzy logic and machine 
learning algorithms, supported the choice of using fuzzy logic rather than 
machine learning algorithms in such circumstances saying: 
“Humans perform much better when they are able to interpret and 
gain meaning, understanding and information from the training data. 
This is when they can generalize best and draw the best conclusions. ML 
algorithms, however, have no such requirement, and can apply techniques 
such as decision trees and Bayesian inference to obtain results 
approaching the probabilistic optimum without any need to comprehend 
anything”  
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5.5.2 Pre-processing the inputs 
The reasoning module receives its inputs from the IP info finder 
module; these inputs are shown in table 5.8. 
 
Input name Description 
IP Geographic Location Specifies which country the IP is based at 
Is IP in a block list Specfies whether the IP is found in a block list or not 
Is IP an anynomous proxy Specifies whether the IP is an anynomous proxy or not 
Is IP a TOR exit node Specifies whether the IP is a TOR exit node 
IP Rating An array that shows the IP rating on different DNSBL 
Table 5.8: The reasoning module inputs 
Some of the inputs described in the above table need to be pre-
processed before applying them to the fuzzy logic as they are not in a format 
that can be handled by it. Table 5.9 shows how the inputs will be pre- 
processed. 
 
Input name Pre-processing rule 
IP Geographic Location 
The country name will be checked against the 
black listed country specified by the 
administrator. If it is found in that list, the 
value will be set to one. Otherwise, it will be 
set to zero. The input will be renamed to ‘is 
IP in a black listed country’ 
Is IP in a block list Does not need processing as it is a boolean value 
Is IP an anynomous proxy Does not need processing as it is a boolean value 
Is IP a TOR exit node Does not need processing as it is a boolean value 
IP Rating 
The average IP rating will be calculated. If 
the IP address is not found in any DNSBL, 
the value will be set to 3. 
Table 5.9: Pre-processing the reasoning module inputs 
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5.5.3 Fuzzy logic  
As described in chapter three, the fuzzy logic system consists of four 
elements; fuzzifier, rule base, defuzzifier and inference engine. These 
components, as shown in figure 5.6, interact with each other in order to 
produce an output. The following sections will discuss how each element 
will be used and configured in the reasoning module. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: A fuzzy logic elements 
The fuzzifier is responsible for converting the crisp inputs to fuzzy 
sets by using specified membership functions for each input. It was found 
that four inputs (is IP in black- listed country, is IP an anonymous proxy, is 
IP Tor Exit, and IP block listed) are Boolean, which can be handled by a 
singleton function. The membership function selected for each of these 
inputs, as shown in figure 5.7, is only set to one at a single value. On the 
other hand, the membership function selected for IP rating is specified using 
triangle functions, as shown in figure 5.8. The figure shows that IP 
reputation can be described as high or low in the selected membership 
function. 
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Figure 5.7: The membership function selected for the inputs 
having Boolean values 
 
 
Figure 5.8: The selected membership function for IP reputation 
Rule base is the part that contains the logic of producing the output. 
It contains a number of (if …. then) rules that will be used by the 
interference engine to produce a fuzzy output. Table 5.10 shows the rules 
used in the reasoning module to predict malicious traffic.  
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1
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If condition Then ststement 
(IP in a block list) Possible malicious traffic 
(IP country in a black list) AND (IP is an 
anynomous proxy ) Possible malicious traffic 
(IP country in a black list) AND (IP is a 
TOR exit node ) Possible malicious traffic 
(IP Rating is low) Possible malicious traffic 
Table 5.10: If then rules used in the reasoning module 
The first rule is straightforward, the IP will be considered as a 
malicious one if the IP address is found in a block list. Finding an IP in a 
block list means that the IP address has been reported to be used in 
malicious activities. The second and third rules check two parameters. One 
of them is whether IP is in the black listed countries or not. It is not practical 
to consider an IP as a malicious one if it is only located in one of the 
countries found in the black list as there may be legal traffic from those 
countries. Anonymous proxies and tor are used in a way that enable users to 
protect access the web anonymously. Attacker normally do not need to be in 
the listed countries, they direct their traffic through a proxy or tor located in 
one of those countries. Therefore, getting a traffic from anonymous proxies 
or tor exit nodes located in those countries raise an alert of potential 
malicious traffic. The last rule checks the average IP rating (the host 
reputation). The IP address will be considered malicious if the average 
rating is low.   
The defuzzifier is responsible for converting the fuzzy output to a 
crisp value using a selected membership function for the output. Figure 5.9 
shows the selected membership function for the output. The produced 
output gives the probability of having malicious traffic from the checked IP 
address. The final output will be considered as malicious if it is higher than 
0.5, otherwise it will be considered as a normal. 
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Figure 5.9: The selected membership function for the output 
The inference engine can be considered as the heart of reasoning, as 
it is responsible for mapping given inputs to a fuzzy output, using the 
specified rules. The inference engine used in this module is mamdani, which 
is commonly used in fuzzy logic system and successfully applied in 
classification problems (Mathworks, 2015). 
5.5.4 Implementation 
 The reasoning module has been implemented using PHP and 
MySQL. Figure 5.10 shows the flow chart of the reasoning module. 
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Figure 5.10: The flow chart of the reasoning module 
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5.5.5 Using Message Broker 
It was found that evaluating each incoming or outgoing packet will 
take a certain time, as it involves sending API requests in addition to the 
processing time in the reasoning module. During that time, the system may 
send or receive many network packets that the proposed system may miss 
processing. Therefore, it is essential to modify the proposed system in a way 
that allows it to process all messages. One of the solutions that can solve 
this problem is to use a message broker between the network sniffing and IP 
info finder modules. The network sniffing module will act as a message 
producer that sends messages containing IP addresses to be checked; it will 
send a message once a network packet is received or sent, without the need 
to wait for other modules to finish their tasks.  The messages sent by the 
network sniffing module will stay in a queue until one of the consumers can 
receive them for processing.  The IP info finder will act as a consumer in 
this case. Figure 5.11 shows what the proposed solution will look like after 
using a message broker. The implementation of the network sniffing and IP 
info finder info will be slightly changed by using RabbitMQ library. 
RabbitMQ is one of message brokers widely used, and simple to use.  
Figure 5.12 shows how the flow chart of the network sniffing module after 
adding the message broker, while figure 5.13 shows the flow chart of IP info 
finder module as a consumer. 
Figure 5.11: The modified version of the proposed solution after adding 
a message broker 
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Figure 5.12: Network sniffing module when using message broker 
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Figure 5.13: The flow chart of the IP information module when using 
message brokers 
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5.6  Summary  
 In conclusion, many researchers use the event correlation approach, 
but the downside of this approach is the need to keep the attack sequence 
patterns up-to-date, in order to detect multi-stage attacks. Thus, another 
approach was applied in this study, to predict multi-stage attacks. This 
approach depends on checking the IP addresses involved in network traffic. 
The proposed solution for using this approach consists of three modules. 
The first one (network sniffing) is responsible for reading network traffic, 
then extracting IP addresses from the packets. This module has been 
implemented by using the TCPDUMP tool. The second module (IP 
information finder) is responsible for getting information about IP addresses 
extracted at the initial stage.  The information is checked by the second 
module, including the IP geographic location, and checking whether the IP 
is on a block list, whether the IP is an anonymous proxy, or a TOR exit 
node, and checking the IP rating in DNSBL. The last module (reasoning) is 
responsible for deciding whether IP addresses may be a source of malicious 
traffic or not, based on information passed from the second module. The 
outputs of the second module need to be pre-processed before processing 
them. The reasoning module was implemented using fuzzy logic. The 
reason for choosing the fuzzy logic rather than any of the machine learning 
algorithms is the nature of the problem; it can be simply solved using “if… 
then” rules. In addition, it requires less time and effort to adapt to changes in 
the reasoning logic compared to machine learning algorithms. Machine 
learning algorithms require large sets of training data to get accurate results 
and that consumes a lot of time in the training phase. One of the issues 
found in the proposed system is the high chance of missing some network 
packet, due to the time spent in obtaining the IP information and then 
processing in the reasoning module. This issue has been dealt with by using 
a message broker; the network sniffing module will queue IP addresses 
extracted from network packets, rather than passing them directly to the IP 
info module, and there is no need to wait for IP info finder and the 
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reasoning module to complete their job. The IP info module will then 
consume messages in the queue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   123 
CHAPTER 6 
_________________ 
EVALUATION  
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the proposed solution for predicting multi 
stage attacks was discussed showing their different modules. This chapter 
evaluates the effectiveness of the proposed solution. The evaluation is 
divided into two stages. The first one is measuring the effectiveness of the 
solution by following a metrics based approach. This approach was 
introduced by Fink, et al. (2002). The approach looks at intrusion detection 
systems from different perspective; it includes logistics, architectural, and 
performance metrics. The logistic metrics allocates a score according to the 
perceived merit in each category in terms of maintainability, manageability, 
and dependency. The design metrics is used to find how well the system 
performs in terms of resources consumption and speed. The last metrics 
used in this approach is the confusion metrics (performance metrics), this 
metrics finds how well the system does its job (detecting multi stage 
attacks) in form of true positive, true negative, false positive, and false 
negative.  
The second section of this chapter discusses the logistics metrics, the 
metrics includes evaluating distributed management, ease of configuration, 
ease of policy management, outsource solutions, and platform requirements.  
The third section looks at the design metrics that includes adjustable 
sensitivity, data storage, multi sensor support, firewall interaction, packet 
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loss, and system throughput. Each category in the logistic and design 
metrics will have a score between one and three (one is the lowest and three 
is the highest) based on number advantages and disadvantages For example, 
consider evaluating the system throughput. The system will score one If it 
has a low throughput while it will score two if it has a high throughput but 
with consuming a lot of hardware resources. On the other hand, the system 
will score three if it has a high throughput without consuming a lot of 
hardware resources. The fourth section provides a performance evaluation 
for the system in form of a confusion metrics. The last section gives a 
conclusion for this chapter.  
6.2 Logistics Evaluation 
6.2.1 Distributed Management 
 The distributed management for intrusion detection systems was 
described by Einwechter (2001) as: 
“Multiple Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) over a large network, 
all of which communicate with each other, or with a central server that 
facilitates advanced network monitoring, incident analysis, and instant 
attack data. By having these co-operative agents distributed across a 
network, incident analysts, network operations, and security personnel are 
able to get a broader view of what is occurring on their network as a 
whole.” 
By looking at the proposed solution, it has been found that it can 
support distributed management by having several network sniffing 
modules over a large network. The sniffing module will then queue 
messages that will be consumed by the IP info module that will then feed 
the reasoning module. Figure 6.1 shows the architecture of the solution 
when having a distributed management over a network. In this architecture, 
the centralized server will run both the IP information finder and reasoning 
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modules.  The downside of supporting this structure is creating a bottle nick 
around the IP info and reasoning modules and slowing the process of 
detecting multi stage attack overall. 
 
Figure 6.1: Distributed Management Architecture 
6.2.2 Ease of Configuration 
Ease of configuration means how easy to install and configure the 
system (Fink et al., 2002). In this context, the proposed system will be 
assessed in terms of how easy to install and configure its components. The 
system requires installing APACHE, PHP, MYSQL, TCPDUMP, and 
AMQP. The first four components are easy to install and configure. For 
example, installing APACHE on Linux environment requires running only a 
single command. Moreover, in platforms like windows APACHE, MYSQL, 
and PHP come in one package which simplifies the installation process. On 
the other hand, installing and configuring AMQP is not as simple as others 
components and passes through many steps to get running. Another point is 
considered as a disadvantage in this context is that configuring the 
components of the system is not centralized through one interface and a 
prior knowledge for each component is required in order to configure them. 
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6.2.3 Ease of Policy Management 
Fink et al. (2002) describe measuring ease of policy management in 
their metrics approach as how easy to update, create, and manage detection 
rules. By looking at the proposed system, it has been found that detection 
rules are defined through the fuzzy rules. Updating or adding fuzzy rules is 
very simple and do not require changing the other reasoning module 
components. That advantage of the fuzzy logic was discussed in the 
previous chapter and it is one of the reasons of choosing it rather than any of 
machine learning techniques. However, this advantage does exist as long as 
there are no new inputs to be considered in deducing the output. It may be 
discovered later that there are more IP data (new inputs) indicates whether 
IP addresses are malicious or not. In addition to changing fuzzy rules, 
adding more inputs requires adding more membership functions to the 
fuzzifier.  
6.2.4 Outsource Solutions 
Measuring the level of dependency on external systems to run required 
services is one of parameters required to be highly considered when 
assessing a system. It has been found that the IP information module is 
highly dependent on an external system as it uses web services to get 
information about IP addresses. Although using web services to find IP 
information has the advantage of getting up to date information, it is 
considered at the same time as a disadvantage. Potts and Kopack (2003) 
listed the availability as one of web services pitfalls saying: 
“Everyone who uses the Internet knows that no site is 100% 
available. It follows that Web services, which use the same infrastructure 
as Web sites, will not be 100% available either. Even if the server is up 
and running, your ISP might not be, or the ISP hosting the other side of 
the transaction might not be either.” 
They also mentioned that immutable interface is another issue with 
using web services as request and response structure may be changed in a 
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way that can break the IP information finder. Having the IP information 
finder in a faulty status means that the reasoning module will not be able to 
classify IP addresses as no inputs are provided by the IP information module 
in this case. As a result, malicious traffic may pass through the system 
without raising any alarm. 
6.2.5 Platform Requirements 
The system resources required to run the proposed system is another 
parameter needs to be looked at. The system requires APACHE, MYSQL, 
PHP, TCPDUMP and AMQP. All of those have distributions over different 
operating systems (MAC, Windows, Linux) which gives the system the 
flexibility to run on different platforms. In addition, all of those components 
are free. By looking at the hardware requirements, it has been found that 
there are no specific hardware requirements and it depends on traffic 
volume. For example, memory resources required for buffering messages in 
AMQP are specified based on traffic volume. 
6.2.6  Conclusion 
Table 6.1 shows the score for each item in the logistic assessment. The 
score for the distributed management item is two as the system supports it 
but with some potential issues in the buffering area. The score for of ease of 
configuration and policy management is two, many components can be 
easily installed but the configurations is not centralized on one user interface 
and scattered over different areas. The score for ease of policy management 
is also two as detection rules can be easily changed but using the same 
inputs. The score for outsource solution is poor (one) as the system has been 
found massively dependant on using web services. The score for platform 
requirements are three as the system supports running on different platform 
and its hardware requirements are dependent on network volume traffic. 
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Item Score 
Distributed Management 2 
Ease of configuration 2 
Ease of policy management 2 
Outsource Solutions 1 
Platform Requirements 3 
Table 6.1: Logistic Metrics 
6.3 Design Metrics 
6.3.1 Adjustable sensitivity  
This parameter was defined by Fink, et al. (2002) as follow: 
 
“Ability to change the sensitivity of the IDS to compensate for high 
false positive or false negative ratios.” 
 
By looking at the system, it has been found that the sensitivity of the 
system can be changed by modifying the fuzzy rules which define how to 
find suspicious IP addresses. Modifying the fuzzy rules using the same 
inputs specified in the previous chapter does not require a prior knowledge 
from the user, they are simple and human readable if then rules.   In addition 
to the ability of modifying the fuzzy rules, the threshold value selected for 
the reasoning module output can play a role in adjusting the sensitivity of 
the system. Moreover, changing the black listed countries can have an 
impact in this area. The main disadvantage is the difficulty to consider new 
inputs in modifying the fuzzy rules to adjust the sensitivity. This requires 
adding membership functions to the fuzzifier which requires a prior 
knowledge of the fuzzy logic from the user. 
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6.3.2 Data storage 
The system requires only to store fuzzy rules and black listed countries 
in a database, the size of this data does not exceed one Megabyte. This 
advantage is a result of using web services that get information about IP 
addresses, the alternative of using web services was to store information 
about IP addresses in a database and regularly update them. That database 
would include tables for IP geographic information, block listed IP 
addresses, and anonymous proxies. The size of such database would be 
around 1 Gigabytes. 
6.3.3 Multi sensor support  
In this context, sensor is defined as network sniffer that reads network 
packets coming from/to the system. The structure of the system supports 
having multi sensor, this is a result of using buffer that queues messages 
coming from network sniffing modules (sensors) and those messages are 
consumed by the IP information module. In addition, different sensors can 
be used with the system rather than the one implemented in the previous 
chapter, the sensor just needs to send a message containing an IP address. 
6.3.4 Firewall Interaction 
The reasoning module has been implemented in PHP which allows any 
person with prior knowledge of PHP to modify it as it is open source and 
not compiled files. Therefore, it is possible to modify it in a way that 
interacts with firewall based on the output it produces. For example, the 
reasoning module classifies an IP address as malicious so it necessary to add 
a firewall rules that blocks traffic from IP address. 
6.3.5 Incident logging and notifications 
As mentioned in the previous section, the system has been implemented 
using PHP. Thus, it can be modified in a way that suits an organization to 
notify and log incidents captured. For example, the system can be modified 
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to email the system administrator in case of capturing a traffic coming from 
a suspicious IP address.  
6.3.6 Packet Loss 
The proposed system uses TCPDUMP to capture network packets, this 
tool is very effective in monitoring tasks. However, it was reported by 
Antichi et al. (2014) in their research about monitoring high speed networks 
that software based on timestamping and capture such as TCPDUMP is not 
suitable to monitor traffic in scenarios where network speeds increases and 
this may lead to losing capturing some packets. 
6.3.7 System throughput 
The system throughput can be defined as how many packets the system 
can process per second. The system throughput depends on the environment 
it is running at. It has been found that the throughput of the system when 
running on the environment specified in table 6.2 was 10 packets/second. 
 
CPU Intel Core(TM) i7 CPU (2.1 GHz) 
RAM 8 GB 
Operating System Windows 7 
Table 6.2: Test environment for measuring system throughput` 
6.3.8  Conclusion 
Table 6.3 shows the score for each item in the design assessment. The 
score for adjustable sensitivity is two as it supports adjusting sensitivity 
through modifying the fuzzy rules but associated with some difficulties in 
some scenarios. The score of data storage is three as it does not require more 
than on Megabyte to store fuzzy rules and blacklisted countries in a 
database. The score for multi-sensor support is three as it does that with the 
ability to be communicated with different sensors than the one proposed 
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with the system. The score for both firewall interaction and incident 
logging/notification is also three at the system is an open source PHP code 
that can be easily modified. The score for packet loss is two as TCPDUMP 
can not perform well in high speed networks. The system throughput on the 
testing environment has achieved an acceptable rate so the score will be two 
for this item. 
 
Item Score 
Adjustable sensitivity 2 
Data Storage 3 
Multi sensor support 3 
Firewall Interaction 3 
Incident Logging and notification 3 
Packet loss 2 
System Throughput 2 
Table 6.3: Design Metrics 
6.4 Performance Evaluation 
6.4.1 Testing Data 
The performance evaluation will involve two phases. The first one is 
evaluating whether the system  is capable of detecting suspicious IP 
addresses, this will be achieved by building an IP list from different sources 
then go through each IP address in the list and apply it to the system and 
find out whether the system will classify as expected or not. The IP list will 
include suspicious addresses in different categories such as block listed, 
anonymous proxy or exit tor node in a predefined blacklisted countries list. 
In this experiment, the black listed country list will include China, Russia, 
and North Korea. The sources used in building this list are SANS (around 
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5,000 IP addresses), emerging threats (around 15,000 IP addresses), 
iblocklist around 61,000 IP addresses), and proxy nova (523 IP addresses 
for anonymous proxies).  The second phase will test the system with some 
multi-stage attacks, this will be achieved by using trace files of captured 
traffic that involve multi stage attacks, the purpose of this phase is to prove 
that the system can detect multi stage attacks. The trace files were obtained 
from Computer Networks and Security research Group at Mugla Sitki 
Kocman University.  
6.4.2 First Phase 
As mentioned above, the aim of the first phase is to test whether the 
system is able to find suspicious IP addresses or not. The IP test list as 
shown in Table 6.4 includes different categories; Normal IP addresses in 
blacklisted countries, Normal IP addresses not in black listed countries, 
anonymous proxies in blacklisted countries, and block listed IP addresses.    
 
           Category Number of IP addresses Percentage 
Normal IP addresses 10,000 10.99% 
Anonymous proxy in a black listed 
country 
523 0.57% 
Block listed IP addresses 81,221 88.53% 
Table 6.4: Different classes in the IP test list 
A PHP script has been developed to perform the testing process. The 
scrip goes through the IP test list and applies each IP address to the IP info 
finder module which will then feeds the reasoning module with IP info. The 
output of the reasoning module is then compared with the expected result to 
update false positive, false negative, true positive, and true negative figures.  
Figure 6.2 shows the flow chart of the testing script. 
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Figure 6.2: The flow chart of the testing proces 
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The results obtained from the first phase of the testing (see table 6.5) 
shows that all normal IP addresses are classified correctly (false positive is 
zero and true negative is one). On the other hand, the system managed to 
classify suspicious IP address with 0.994 true positive and 0.006 false 
negative.  Most of IP addresses incorrectly classified are anonymous proxies 
located in black listed countries (357 IP addresses out of 523). This area can 
be improved by using another web service that is more sophisticated in 
finding anonymous IP addresses. One of those sophisticated web service is 
fraud lab (fraudlabs, 2015).  By using the fraud lab web, the true positive 
went to 0.9984 as shown in table 6.6.  
 
True Negative False Positive 
1 0 
True Positive False negative 
.994 0.006 
Table 6.5: The confusion metrics 
 
True Negative False Positive 
1 0 
True Positive False negative 
.9984 0.0016 
Table 6.6: The confusion metrics after using the fraud lab web service 
to detect anonymous proxy 
6.4.3 The Second Phase 
6.4.3.1 SQL Attack Scenario  
In this scenario, the attacker tried to perform a SQL injection in order to 
compromise a user on a web application. Table 6.7 shows IP participated in 
this scenario. If IP addresses are extracted from the trace files in the packets 
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order then apply them to the proposed system, the system will raise an alert 
from on the first packet. The system has found that 220.245.173.190 is a 
suspicious IP address (block listed IP address). 
 
IP Addresses 
220.245.173.190 
12.25.187.58 
12.25.187.61 
12.25.187.255 
 
Table 6.7:  IP participated in the sql attack Scenario 
6.4.3.2 UDP Scan Scenario 
In this scenario, attackers performed a UDP scan using Nmap tool to 
get some information for further attack steps not included in the trace file. 
Table 6.8 shows IP participated in that attack. By applying the IPs extracted 
from the packets at the same order, the system raised an alert on the first 
packet, 24.6.173.220 has been found a suspicious IP address as it is block 
listed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.8: IP participated in the UDP scan Scenario 
 
 
IP Address 
24.6.173.220 
74.207.244.221 
74.207.244.221 
24.6.173.220 
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6.4.3.3 Exploiting Cross site Forgery Scenario 
In this scenario, attackers exploited the cross site forgery 
vulnerability in a web application to change the password for a certain user. 
Table 6.9 shows IP participated in that scan. The system failed to raise an 
alert as none of IP address participated were classified as suspicious IP 
address. 
 
IP Address 
69.181.135.56 
67.161.39.46 
 
Table 6.9: IP participated in the cross site forgery scenario 
6.4.3.4 Dictionary Attack Scenario 
In this scenario, attackers performed a dictionary attack against FTP 
server. Table 6.10 shows IP participated in that scan. It has been found that 
the system raised an alert at the first packet indicating that 69.181.135.56 is 
a suspicious IP address (Block listed IP address). 
 
IP Address 
69.181.135.56 
67.161.39.46 
 
Table 6.10: IP participated in dictionary attack against FTP server 
6.5 Conclusion 
The evaluation has been divided into two phases. In the first phase, the 
metrics approach was followed. The metrics approach includes logistic, 
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design, and performance evaluation. In the logistic evaluation, it has been 
found that the score was medium (two) for supporting distributed 
management, ease of configuration, and ease of policy management. The 
system has a poor score in using outsource solutions while it achieved a 
high score in the platform requirements. By moving to the design metrics, it 
has been found that the system gets a high score in most of design criteria 
including data storage, multi sensor support, firewall interaction, incident 
logging and notification. However, it achieved a poor score in the system 
output. In addition, it is not performing well in high speed network and 
losses some packet due to using TCPDUMP in monitoring traffic. By 
looking at the performance evaluation, it has been found that the 
performance of the system in finding suspicious IP addresses after using the 
fraud lab web service to detect anonymous proxy.  
The system was also tested with four real multi stage attack scenarios 
captured from a real network traffic. The system managed to capture three 
of them, while it failed to capture one of them as the IP addresses not 
classified as malicious.  In the second phase, the proposed system was 
compared with solutions proposed by other researchers. It has been found 
that system does not require complex computation and memory resources 
compared to other solutions. On the other hand, it has been found that the 
main disadvantages is that  it may not be able to capture an attack if IP 
addresses participated are not classified as suspicious while other solutions 
concerns about the attack logic not at identity of attacks sources. The 
proposed system is not a silver bullet for all multi stage attacks but it helps 
in reducing the occurrence of multi stage attacks. Introducing a system that 
based on event correlation and IP information (hybrid approach) will reduce 
the possibility of multi stage occurrence compared to using each approach 
individually.  
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CHAPTER 7 
_________________ 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Overview 
Many surveys and studies have shown the impact of cyber-attacks on 
organisations, governments, and individuals around the world. Although 
there are developments occurring in the computer security field, there are 
still cyber-attacks causing damage, because they are constantly being 
developed and evolved by attackers.  This study has shown that improving 
intrusion detection methods is a vital element in enhancing the security of a 
system overall. This research investigated some industrial challenges in the 
intrusion detection area, identifying two main challenges; the first one is 
finding signature based intrusion detection systems such as SNORT lack the 
capability of detecting attacks with new signatures without human 
intervention. The other challenge is related to multi-stage attacks detection, 
and it has been found that signature-based is not efficient in this area. The 
contribution of this study has been in proposing methodologies that tackle 
the mentioned challenges. 
   139 
7.2  Automatic Creation for SNORT Rules 
As mentioned in the previous section, signature-based intrusion detection 
systems lack the capability of detecting attacks with new signatures. Part of 
the solution offered in this study has dealt with that issue through a multi-
layer classification approach. In this approach, the first layer tries to classify 
the traffic either to normal or malicious. If the first layer fails to classify the 
traffic, the second layer (the reasoning module) will be triggered to classify 
the traffic. Both layers are based on data mining techniques. The signature 
holder will then be updated with the new attack signature. The first one was 
built using the J45 Decision Tree algorithm. The selection of this algorithm 
came after comparing results obtained by that algorithm with results obtained 
using the Naïve Bayes algorithm. The experiment conducted used the 
KDD’99 intrusion detection data set. The data were collected as a result of a 
setup of a fictitious military network with a number of target machines 
running various services. The data set consisted of 41 discrete and 
continuous attributes and had 22 attack classes and 1 normal class, where 
each instance in the data set was categorised as one class. A Correlation-
based Feature Selection (CFS) algorithm was employed to evaluate the 
importance of each feature and provide a subset of features. The result of 
applying this algorithm in the data set was ten features. The selected features 
from the data set were used to train and evaluate both the Decision Tree and 
the Naïve Bayes. The results in the experiment showed that, although Naïve 
Bayes has a high TP, it is skewed by results of FP. On the other hand, the 
Decision Tree generates almost a consistent high TP and consistent low FP.  
The reasoning module is based on a hybrid approach. Consisting of two 
modules; the first one is based on a neural network while the second one is 
based on fuzzy logic. The reasoning module will only classify network 
traffic as normal if both modules classify it as normal, while it will classify it 
as attack if either of them classifies the traffic as attack. A neural network 
has the advantage of the ability to work with incomplete and imprecise data. 
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This advantage can be employed in an IDS context for detecting attack 
patterns presented during the training phase but modified by an attacker in 
order to pass through the system. The flexibility of fuzzy logic can be 
employed in case of uncertain problems of intrusion detection and allows 
much greater complexity for IDS.  
The benefit of using the hybrid approach is in increasing the intrusion 
detection rate; some of the attacks may not be detected by one of the 
modules but another one may be able to detect them. In other words, one 
module will overcome some of the other module’s shortcomings in detecting 
malicious traffic. However, there is a chance of increasing the false positive 
rate for malicious traffic for the composite module, compared to each one 
individually. The data set used in the second layer is used to train the neural 
network and deduce the rules for the fuzzy logic module. It is then used to 
evaluate the reasoning module. The evaluation result showed that the true 
positive rate achieved was 0.966 with the neural network, 0.9995 with fuzzy 
logic, and 0.9997 when combining them together in one module. On the 
other hand, the false positive rate was .029 with the neural network, .022 
with fuzzy logic, and increased to .048 with the composite module as 
expected. 
Although good results were achieved in that area, some limitations have 
been found. One of those limitations is that both the neural network and 
Decision Tree modules may regularly require additional training to improve 
efficiency with detecting new patterns of attacks. The training process 
requires large set of data and consumes a lot of time. The fuzzy logic rules 
may also need to be updated in order to detect new patterns but it does not 
require as much time to get updated as the Decision Tree and neural network 
modules. The computer security context is always dynamic and changes 
dramatically. Thus, it is essential to update the modules used in the proposed 
approach when the true positive rate falls below a threshold value specified 
by the system administrator. In our case, all modules created in the 
experiments will definitely require an update if they are to be used with a 
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live system, as they were built using an old data set (KDD 1999).  That data 
set was used to prove the concept of the approach. Part of this data set was 
used for training and creating fuzzy rules while the other part was used for 
evaluation to test whether the system was able to detect patterns not 
represented in the training process. 
Another limitation that has been found is that fuzzy logic is relatively 
slow in processing the network traffic compared to the neural network and 
Decision Tree; this slowness is down to the size of fuzzy rules (1343 rules 
were used in the experiment). The inference engine needs to evaluate the 
rules with the fuzzy inputs provided, in order to produce an output. In 
addition to these limitations, the proposed approach will not help signature-
based intrusion detection systems in improving multi-stage attack detection. 
Each step in multi-stage attacks looks legitimate and does not violate any 
rules with signature-based intrusion detection systems. 
7.3 Multi-Stage Attack Prediction 
The other industrial challenge that this study focused on was multi-stage 
attack detection. These attacks occur through multiple phases to get access to 
an organisation. Most of these attacks pass through three stages. In the first 
stage, attackers try to analyse available information about the target to find 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses that can be exploited. In the second stage, 
attackers exploit the weaknesses found in the first phase to inject malware 
into, or gain access to, the system. In addition, they try to get more details 
and conduct a deep analysis about the system to find data or resources they 
have an interest in. In the final phase attackers destroy the system or steal 
valuable information.  
The study started looking at this industrial challenge by analysing four 
different multi-stage attack scenarios to understand the behaviour of multi-
stage attacks and find any clue to predicting or detecting such kinds of 
attacks. In each scenario, the network traffic was analysed highlighting all 
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the steps that occurred and which were not considered by many security 
systems. The first scenario was about communication with a bad DNS server 
and how that can be exploited by an attacker to register machines to its bot 
army. The second scenario discussed the Shady Rat attack, which is a good 
example that shows how social engineering can be employed to target an 
organisation. The third scenario showed how header splitting can be 
employed by an attacker to target a network connected to a web host running 
a web application. The last scenario discussed how a vulnerable FTP service 
can be exploited to perform multi-stage attacks. An analysis of these four 
scenarios indicated that predicting such kinds of attacks may be achieved by 
carrying out a reputation check of IP addresses found in incoming and 
outgoing traffic. 
The proposed approach in predicting multi-stage attacks is based on 
evaluating IP information. This approach was preferred over the event 
correlation- based approach, as the latter one requires having up-to-date 
multi-stage attack patterns (sequence), which is not easy to achieve in a very 
short time, as discovering new complex attacks normally takes some time. 
The Shady Rat Operation attack is a good example of that; it started in 2006 
but was only discovered in 2011. 
 The proposed solution involves using three modules. The first one 
(network sniffing) is in charge of reading network traffic, and then 
extracting IP addresses from the packets. This module was built by using the 
TCPDUMP tool.  The TCPDUMP was preferred over other sniffing tools, 
as it is available on many operating systems. In addition, it can be easily 
integrated into the proposed solution, as it is command line-based.  
The second module (IP information finder) was created to gather 
information about IP addresses extracted from the first module. There were 
two options to obtain the IP information. The first option was by storing IP 
information in a database, then checking the IP address against it to find any 
associated information. The second option was to obtain the IP information 
   143 
through one of the available web services (API). The main disadvantage of 
this first solution was the need to be regularly updated. On the other hand, 
there are many web services regularly updated and, therefore, it was decided 
to go with the second option. The information obtained by the second 
module involved finding the IP geographic location, checking whether the 
IP was on a block list, whether the IP was an anonymous proxy, or a TOR 
exit node, and checking the IP rating in DNSBL. The last module 
(reasoning) was responsible for deciding whether the IP addresses may be a 
source of malicious traffic or not, based on information passed from the 
second module. The outputs of the second module need to be pre-processed 
before processing them.  
The reasoning module was implemented using fuzzy logic. The 
reason for choosing fuzzy logic, rather than any of the machine learning 
algorithms, was the nature of the problem; it can be simply solved using 
“if… then” rules. In addition, it requires less time and effort to adapt to 
changes in the reasoning logic compared to machine learning algorithms. 
Machine learning algorithms require large sets of training data to get 
accurate results and that consumes a lot of time in the training phase. The 
fuzzy logic was initially tested with four rules. The first rule stated that the 
IP will be considered as a malicious one if the IP address is found in a block 
list. Having an IP in a block list implies that the IP address was reported as 
being used in malicious traffic. The second and third were similar, with each 
rule involving the checking of two parameters. One of them was finding 
whether the IP was based in one of   the black listed countries or not. Being 
in a black listed country does not mean that the traffic is malicious, as there 
may be legal traffic from those countries.  The second parameter checked 
whether an anonymous proxy or exit tor node was used or not. Anonymous 
proxies and exit tor nodes are used in a way that enables users to protect 
their access to the web anonymously. Attackers normally do not necessarily 
need to be based in the listed countries, they forward their traffic through a 
proxy or tor located in one of those countries. Thus, receiving traffic from 
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anonymous proxies or tor exit nodes located in those countries raises an 
alert of potential malicious traffic. The last rule was to find out the average 
IP rating (the host reputation). The IP address is treated as malicious if the 
average rating is low. 
The evaluation process of the proposed approach was carried out using 
the metrics based approach which looked at the evaluated approach from the 
different perspectives of logistic, design, and performance. The last metric 
used in this approach was the confusion metric (performance metric), which 
finds how well the system does its job (detecting multi-stage attacks) in the 
form of true positive, true negative, false positive, and false negative. The 
logistic metrics evaluates the system in terms of maintainability, 
manageability, and dependency. It was found that the proposed approach got 
a medium score from the logistics perspective. On the other hand, it had a 
high score when looking from the design perspective that measured how 
well the approach performed in terms of resources consumption and speed. 
Regarding the performance, it was first measured using a list of 91,744 IP 
addresses, including different categories (10.99% Normal, 0.57% 
anonymous proxy in a black listed country, 88.53% block listed IP 
addresses) to ensure that the approach was capable of distinguishing between 
malicious and normal IP addresses. It was found that the system achieved a 
good performance with zero false positive and a high true positive rate 
(0.9984). However, it was found in the second stage of the performance 
evaluation that it failed to detect multi-stage attack scenarios, if the IP 
addresses participating in the traffic were not classified as malicious IP 
addresses. That stage involved testing the approach with four different multi-
stage attack scenarios.  
When comparing the proposed solution with other solutions based on 
event correlation, it has an advantage over them by not being dependent on 
receiving alerts from IDS. In addition, it does not require a complex 
computation, or memory resources, compared to them. Furthermore, the 
previous solutions required an update with sequences of new attacks, while 
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the proposed solution focuses on the identity. However, this may represent 
an issue, if an attack comes from an IP address not classified yet as 
suspicious. Moreover, the throughput of the proposed system is relatively 
low compared to other solutions, due to using web services that take some 
time to get IP information. 
 
7.4 Future Work 
It is planned to overcome some of the limitations found in the 
proposed approaches during the experiments. One of those limitations is the 
slowness found with the fuzzy logic module created in the system that 
automates the creation of automatic rules. The work to be carried out in this 
area will involve optimising a number of rules used with the fuzzy logic 
modules. In addition, it is intended to re-create both the Neural Network and 
fuzzy logic modules using all classes, and then compare the results with 
results obtained in this study.  Moreover, different data mining techniques 
will be tried with fuzzy logic and Neural.  
Moving to the multi-stage detection area, it is planned to improve the IP 
information module by using alternative web services, in case the web 
service provided by Neutrino fails. It can be investigated whether there is 
more IP information that can be used in identifying malicious traffic. The 
proposed approach in this research can also be combined with an event 
correlation-based approach to gain advantage of both approaches by looking 
at both identities and traffic content. 
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Appendix A: Project plan 
A.1 Project Management Methodology 
The project management methodology used in this project is a 
modified approach of Method123 project management methodology, which 
is a Prince2 based methodology. Method123 includes some activities which 
are used with medium and large sized projects. Some of those activities not 
applicable to this research project. Thus, Method123 has been tailored to 
suit the project's size and requirements.  
A.2 Project Schedule 
Table A.1 shows the break down structure of the project, detailing its 
phases, and activities while figure 1.3 shows the Gantt chart. This illustrates 
the project schedule, showing that the project requires n working days for 
completion.  
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  Activity Start End 
Li
te
ra
tu
re
 su
rv
ey
 
Investigation about honeypot 11/01/2011 09/30/12 
Investigation about IDS 11/01/2011 12/31/11 
Investigation about data mining 
techniques 01/01/2012 03/31/12 
Preparation for a conference 04/01/2012 07/31/12 
Writing the first year report 08/01/2012 08/31/12 
Ex
pe
ri
m
en
t 1
 Requirement Analysis 09/01/2012 09/30/12 
Design 10/01/2012 09/30/13 
Implementation 10/01/2012 11/15/12 
Evaluation 11/16/12 12/31/12 
Preparation for a conference 01/01/2013 05/31/13 
Writing the second year report 06/01/2013 07/31/13 
Ex
pe
ri
m
en
t 1
 Requirement Analysis 08/01/2013 08/31/13 
Design 09/01/2013 09/30/13 
Implementation 10/01/2013 09/30/14 
Evaluation 10/01/2013 11/15/13 
Preparation for a conference 11/16/13 12/31/13 
Writing the second year report 01/01/2014 05/31/14 
W
ri
tin
g 
U
P 
Chapter 2 06/01/2014 07/31/14 
Chapter 3 08/01/2014 08/31/14 
Chapter 4 09/01/2014 09/30/14 
Chapter 5 10/01/2014 05/31/15 
Chapter 6 10/01/2014 10/31/14 
Chapter 1 11/01/2014 11/30/14 
Chapter 7 12/01/2014 12/31/14 
Finalizing the document 01/01/2015 01/31/15 
 
Table A.1: The project schedule 
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Fig A.1: GANT Chart 
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A.3 Resource plan 
In this research project, some software tools and equipment are 
required along this research project. Table A.2 shows the schedule of 
resource. 
 
Resource  Purpose of usage Start Date End Date 
Software 
      
      
Method123 Project Management 01/11/2011 01/08/2015 
Wika Implementation 01/01/2013 01/08/2015 
  
Implementation 01/01/2013 01/08/2014 PHP 
  
  
Implementation 01/01/2013 01/08/2014 MYSQL 
  
Virtual Machines Testing 01/01/2013 01/08/2014 
Equipment 
      
      
Machine with internet connection 
  
01/11/2011 01/08/2015 
Finding 
information 
from the 
internet, 
writing reports 
and working in 
the 
development 
environment. 
  
  
Testing  01/01/2013 01/08/2014 Web Server 
  
 
Table A.2:  Resource plan 
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A.3 Communications plan 
Table 1.3 describes the communication activities required to get and 
receive information in a timely manner. 
Activity Time Frame Description 
Phase Completion Discussion Yearly 
Discussing phase outcomes and plan for 
following phase (Meeting the 
supervisor) 
Feedback Request Monthly 
Requesting a feedback from the 
supervisor after completing a piece of 
work (e.g. conference paper, design) 
 
Table A.3:  Communication plan 
A.4 Risk plan 
A.4.1 Feasibility – Automated Data Analysis 
Likelihood Impact Priority 
High High High 
Risk Description: 
In the project schedule, some activities may be 
underestimated. Therefore, there is a chance to miss the deadline. 
Contingency Plan: 
This risk can be overcome by working in holidays and 
increasing the number of working hours per day to 10 hour in order. 
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A.4.2 Data Loss 
Likelihood   Impact   Priority 
High High High 
Risk Description: 
There is a chance to loss all project data and files due to 
some hardware failure. 
Contingency Plan: 
It is essential to store the data in multiple device in addition to 
a cloud storage area. 
 
A.4.3 Feasibility – Automated Data Analysis 
Likelihood   Impact Priority 
Medium Medium Medium 
Risk Description: 
In order to perform data analysis, various data mining 
algorithms would be studied for their feasibility with regard to 
application in anomaly detection autonomously. This would require 
initial creation implementation based in offline data that would be 
subjected to analysis. There is a risk that a rather than one technique, 
a combination of methods would be useful for analysis. 
Contingency Plan: 
In order to mitigate this risk it would be ensured that 
technique or combination of techniques that lead to high true 
positive rate and low false negative rate would be selected. Based on 
these results of initial feasibility for a data mining technique with 
regard to anomaly detection, techniques would be selected for 
implementation in automated data analysis. 
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A.4.4 Implementation Issues 
Likelihood    Impact   Priority 
High Low Medium 
 
Risk Description: 
Implementation of analysis techniques may require 
additional set of skills with regard to programming that researcher 
may have to learn or get trained for. This may cause delay and can 
have cascading effect on all the following activities. 
Contingency Plan: 
The researcher aims to use Java for purpose of development. 
Various third party application programming interfaces have been 
written for analysis techniques in Java, hence it would mitigate the 
risk of delay caused due to creation of technique. 
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Appendix B:  Neural Network 
Training Code 
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Appendix C:  Fuzzy Rules 
Generation Code 
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Appendix D:  Hybrid Module Code 
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Appendix E:  Network sniffing 
module Code 
 
   180 
Appendix F:  IP Information 
Finder Module 
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Appendix G:  The reasoning 
Module Code 
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Appendix H:  The Network Sniffing 
Module Code with a message 
broker 
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Appendix I:  The IP Information 
Module Code with a message 
broker 
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Appendix J:  The Test Script for 
Multi-stage Prediction 
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